Scholars' Mine
Masters Theses

Student Theses and Dissertations

Spring 2016

A meta-architecture analysis for a coevolved system-of-systems
George Anthony Muller IV

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons

Department:
Recommended Citation
Muller, George Anthony IV, "A meta-architecture analysis for a coevolved system-of-systems" (2016).
Masters Theses. 7514.
https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses/7514

This thesis is brought to you by Scholars' Mine, a service of the Missouri S&T Library and Learning Resources. This
work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the
permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact scholarsmine@mst.edu.

A META-ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS FOR A COEVOLVED
SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS

by

GEORGE ANTHONY MULLER IV

A THESIS
Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the
MISSOURI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
2016
Approved by

Dr. Cihan Dagli, Advisor
Dr. Ivan Guardiola
Dr. Steven Corns

Copyright 2016
GEORGE ANTHONY MULLER IV
All Rights Reserved

iii
ABSTRACT

Modern engineered systems are becoming increasingly complex. This is driven
in part by an increase in the use of systems-of-systems and network-centric concepts to
improve system performance. The growth of systems-of-systems allows stakeholders to
achieve improved performance, but also presents new challenges due to increased complexity. These challenges include managing the integration of asynchronously developed
systems and assessing SoS performance in uncertain environments.
Many modern systems-of-systems must adapt to operating environment changes to
maintain or improve performance. Coevolution is the result of the system and the environment adapting to changes in each other to obtain a performance advantage. The complexity that engineered systems-of-systems exhibit poses challenges to traditional systems
engineering approaches. Systems engineers are presented with the problem of understanding how these systems can be designed or adapted given these challenges. Understanding
how the environment influences system-of-systems performance allows systems engineers
to target the right set of capabilities when adapting the system for improved performance.
This research explores coevolution in a counter-trafficking system-of-systems and
develops an approach to demonstrate its impacts. The approach implements a trade study
using swing weights to demonstrate the influence of coevolution on stakeholder value,
develops a novel future architecture to address degraded capabilities, and demonstrates
the impact of the environment on system performance using simulation. The results provide systems engineers with a way to assess the impacts of coevolution on the system-ofsystems, identify those capabilities most affected, and explore alternative meta-architectures
to improve system-of-systems performance in new environments.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Modern systems continue to grow in complexity. This is driven in part by an
increase in the use of systems-of-systems and network-centric concepts to improve system performance. This growth allows stakeholders to achieve improved performance at
the cost of increased complexity. This complexity is a result of expanded mission sets,
asynchronous development and integration of new and legacy systems, and changing operational environments. These challenges often result in systems unable to meet future
demands, reducing their effectiveness from anticipated levels. As a result, systems-ofsystems must adapt to these challenges to maintain or improve performance.
The concept of coevolution defines the behavior that results when systems and their
environment each adapt to changes in the other. Coevolution is the behavior exhibited by
a system and its environment adapting to changes in each other to obtain a performance
advantage. While this phenomenon is recognized in many biological and ecological systems, its relevance and application to complex engineered systems has not been studied in
great detail. The ability to characterize coevolution in engineered systems allows improved
performance by focusing efforts on the right set of performance measures and system attributes early in the system lifecycle and when improving existing systems. The goal for
understanding coevolution in engineered systems is to improve performance in uncertain
future environments.
The aim of this research is to develop an approach for assessing a system-ofsystems (SoS) that experiences coevolution. The counter-trafficking SoS is a system that
reflects this behavior. This system is comprised of surveillance and interdiction systems,
information sources, analytical practices, and decision makers. System components perform discrete functions which enable the detection, investigation, apprehension and prose-
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cution of illicit network actors in order to disrupt their activities. Coevolution is specifically
demonstrated between the detection and interdiction elements of the SoS meta-architecture
and the smuggling vessels these sub-systems are designed to detect and interdict.

1.2. RESEARCH APPROACH
The research objectives are to demonstrate the impact of coevolution between a
SoS and its operating environment. The following key research questions are explored in
this work are:
• is coevolution present in current engineered systems-of-systems?
• if so, how can the system-of-systems meta-architecture be assessed to evaluate its
performance?
• how should the system be targeted for improvement?
• what insights can modeling the system meta-architecture under coevolution provide?
The research approach to answer these questions evaluates the counter-trafficking
SoS by extending a current trade study methodology, develops a conceptual meta-architecture
representative of coevolutionary behavior, develops a set of models to assess this conceptual meta-architecture performance versus the existing meta-architecture in an adaptive
environment, and evaluates the impact of uncertainty in the operational environment on the
recommended SoS alternatives.

1.3. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 has presented the research motivation and general approach. Chapter 2 provides a background in several relevant research
areas, including systems engineering, complex systems, operations research methods and
a history of drug-trafficking in the Americas. Chapter 3 reviews systems engineering and
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SoS engineering concepts. A description of the counter-trafficking SoS is provided in
Chapter 4. The research approach is described, thoroughly developed and applied to the
counter-trafficking SoS in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 details an agent based model that expands
the assessment to include variability in meta-architecture capabilities and uncertainty in
the operational environment. Chapter 7 presents the results of this method and describes
the insights resulting from this approach. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the
applicability of the method and promising next steps in Chapter 8.

4
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing research has explored the complex nature of systems-of-systems, characterized the relationships between constituent systems, and developed methods to estimate
SoS performance. This body of research includes concepts from complex systems, SoS
modeling and assessment, network centric systems, and multi-objective decision analysis.
Other research has focused on the effectiveness of counter-trafficking systems. This
research includes systems engineering studies and analysis of drug trafficking organizations. Several operations research approaches have been used to support decision making
in counter-trafficking. These approaches include search theory and the network interdiction
problem.
This chapter reviews these related research areas.

2.1. SYSTEMS CONCEPTS
2.1.1. Systems-of-Systems. Jamshidi [1] defines systems-of-systems (SoS) as “largescale integrated systems that are heterogeneous and independently operable on their own,
but are networked together for a common goal.” The engineering of SoS — SoS design,
analysis, and development — is an emerging challenge due to the complex nature of these
systems. These complexities result from defining, building and managing interfaces between systems that are asynchronously developed. New technologies that rely on rules
governing behavior, such as autonomous systems, rather than fundamental control theory,
such as plant or process control, contribute to this complexity.
The SoS concept is meaningful in that it challenges traditional views of complex
problems. Biological, ecological and engineered systems have been identified as SoS, but
the interest to systems engineers is on designing, assessing and managing engineered SoS.
The Department of Defense (DoD) Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems
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describes four SoS classes that each present unique challenges and opportunities: virtual,
collaborative, acknowledged and directed [2]:
• Virtual systems-of-systems are not centrally managed, lack an acknowledged or
stated purpose and rely on unmanaged interfaces for system operation.
• Collaborative systems-of-systems are primarily driven by volunteer effort, where
standards are developed and maintained by a core set of stakeholders or agents. The
Internet is an example of a Collaborative SoS.
• Acknowledged systems-of-systems rely on multiple systems that contribute to an
overall purpose, but this purpose is not the single objective of any of the system
within the SoS. Often, these systems have several objectives, are accountable to a
wide variety of stakeholders, have different ways of measuring success, and obtain
funding from disparate organizations. These factors combine to influence system
development and sustainment approaches, which influence the overall performance
of the Acknowledged SoS. The maritime counter-trafficking SoS, described in this
thesis, is an example of an Acknowledged SoS.
• Directed systems-of-systems are developed and managed to provide a specific purpose. This SoS is centrally managed during development and operation in order to
fulfill the stated purpose of the SoS. Like other SoS, this purpose may change over
time, but support activities exist to enable the SoS to change in response to changing
user needs and requirements, as well as the operational environment.
Jamshidi [3] discusses theoretical challenges for SoS. These challenges include
developing robust SoS using biologically-inspired approaches, development of SoS standards, developing methods to design SoS architectures, designing SoS simulations, integrating constituent systems for the SoS, and characterizing emergence within complex
SoS. Some of these challenges have been overcome for specific SoS efforts. However,
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the systems engineering community lacks general solutions and has not accepted standard
methods or approaches for these SoS challenges.
The complexity of SoS interfaces, stakeholders, users and operating environments
present challenges for traditional systems engineering analysis for SoS architectures. Agarwal et al. [4] propose a hierarchical architecture framework for Acknowledged SoS. This
framework provides a means to describe a SoS meta-architecture, acquisition environment
and constituent system interfaces using an agent based model (ABM). The model uses
agent negotiation among the constituent systems to identify the best suited constituent systems in terms of capabilities and performance measures. The end result is a tool to aid
SoS decision makers in negotiating and soliciting contributions from constituent system
stakeholders.
Pape et al. [5] provide a method to compare SoS meta-architectures using fuzzy
rules. The fuzzy rules are defined based upon SoS attributes such as performance, affordability and flexibility. The meta-architecture is represented as a chromosome in a genetic
algorithm using a binary encoding scheme to define the presence of constituent systems
and interfaces within the SoS. Chromosome fitness is then evaluated based upon SoS attributes, where constituent systems and interfaces present or absent in the SoS contribute
to the overall SoS performance. The meta-architecture is optimized using a genetic algorithm to manipulate the presence of systems and system-level interfaces. Pape et al. [6]
later applied a similar approach to intelligence, surveillance and reconaissance (ISR) and
search-and-rescue problems, where both systems were categorized as acknowledged SoS.
Dagli et al. [7] developed a decision support approach for SoS managers. This approach uses the wave model of SoS development to model interactions between SoS managers and constituent system managers to negotiate the involvement of these constituent
systems for certain SoS capabilities. This work developed a meta-architecture generation
model, meta-architecture assessment model using key performance attributes, and cooperative, non-cooperative, semi-cooperative, and incentive-based negotiation models. The
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resulting integrated environment allows what-if analysis to explore collaboration between
constituent systems and the resulting impact on SoS performance. By constructing a decision support tool, Dagli et al have addressed key challenges in SoS architecting, including
addressing uncertainties from the variability and availability of constituent systems, exploring evolving needs of the SoS, accounting for socio-technical aspects of motivations of
constituent system managers, and optimizing the architecture based on multiple objectives
subject to budget and resource constraints.
Dagli et al. [8] describe an ABM that supports the acknowledged SoS manager in
negotiating participation by the constituent systems. This tool uses agent behaviors for
each of three participating agents classes (SoS acquisition environment, SoS agent, and
constituent system agents). SoS meta-architectures are generated from negotiation rules,
agent behaviors and a set of multi-objective optimization models. The result is a recommended SoS meta-architecture for an acquisition wave. This meta-architecture is optimized
for the SoS environment while satisfying the constraints of the acquisition environment and
constituent system preferences and behaviors.
Mour et al. [9] describe agent based modeling for SoS in the context of constituent
system behaviors. Mour et al. [9] apply a discrete agent framework to the analysis of a
littoral combat ship squadron. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the performance of
the combat ship against different threats, since these ships can be reconfigured to perform a
variety of missions. The authors identify unexpected results from the ABM of the combat
ship, which provide insights into potential limitations or vulnerabilities of this SoS.
Garrett et al. [10] develop an assessment framework for the ballistic missile defense SoS. This framework focuses on the interfaces, interoperability and integration of
constituent systems. The authors adopt a federated systems approach to constructing the
SoS from the “bottom-up”. Garrett et al. develop three approaches to assess the SoS. The
first method uses graph theory to develop adjacency matrices that characterize SoS interfaces. Different matrices are developed for each mission within the fire control loop. The
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second approach is the development of interface readiness levels. Interface readiness levels
are similar to technology readiness and enterprise readiness levels, but are focused on the
maturity of constituent systems to deliver required information within critical time bounds.
Finally, the authors propose agent-based modeling as a tool well suited for modeling the
interfaces, interoperability and integration of SoS constituent systems.
Chepko and de Weck [11] implement a system architecture design optimization approach to reduce lock-in that arises from early design decisions. The authors developed
a functional hierarchy for which system alternatives were developed. The optimization
model addresses a hierarchical set of discrete and continuous variables, and compatibility
constraints. The authors implemented the optimization model using a genetic algorithm,
and identify future work opportunities including increasing the number of discrete variables and testing the genetic algorithm parameter space.
Ricci et al. [12] applies an options-based approach to maritime security SoS. The
authors note that modern systems suffer from complex, highly dynamic environments that
are inherently uncertain and contribute to reduced system performance. The work by Ricci
et al. allows the identification of options early in the system development cycle to mitigate
potential disruptions to system performance once the system is deployed. The authors
apply the approach using a maritime security SoS and demonstrate that options can be
identified early in the SoS architecture design process.
Alfaris [13] developed an approach called the Evolutionary Design Model and argues that such a framework would enable improved efficiency in the design of complex
systems. Alfaris states that design is a complex, evolutionary process. This reflects design
thinking that occurs over a period of time, as new information or environments alter the
purpose or utility of certain system designs. This work uses logical modeling methods,
including unified modeling language (UML), systems modeling language (SysML) and
object-process methodology (OPM), in combination with mathematical modeling methods
(synthesis, analysis, evaluation and optimization) to construct a framework for the evolu-
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tionary design model, and demonstrated the approach using an evolutionary design for a
city.
2.1.2. Network Centric Systems. Network centric systems are systems that achieve
a desired capability unachievable without connected communications [14]. These systems
may be geographically separated but are connected by communication links. The concept
of network centric systems has emerged with the growth in information access and sharing
and the technologies that support these capabilities. Key performance concepts in network
centric systems are information reach, quality, and timeliness. In general, maximizing
these objectives results in improved performance for the system. Network centric warfare
is the application of network centric systems to defense. The same concepts of network
centric warfare apply beyond the defense space. Network-enabled capabilities support the
“integration of sensors, decision-makers, weapon systems, and support capabilities to enable agility and thus permit commanders to better synchronize effects” [15].
The overarching goal of network centric systems is to enable improved capability, or system effectiveness, by improving the flow of information through the system to
achieve information superiority. A successful network centric system takes advantage of
these attributes to generate and use information superiority. This advantage is obtained
through self-synchronization of actors and shared awareness of the operational environment. In network centric systems, not all actors need to have all information, but each
actor requires the right information to use in their decision making process.
Cares et al. [16] describe fundamental considerations for networked, distributed
systems and their application to network centric warfare. The authors highlight the benefits
and drawbacks of different network architectures. Cares et al. build on network centric
concepts to motivate system design from centralized, linear, non-networked systems to a
decentralized, nonlinear, networked design paradigm. This early work was influential in
motivating research into new ways of engineering SoS.
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2.1.3. Complex Systems. SoS often have some characteristics of complex systems. According to Boccara [17], complex systems have three key characteristics:
• Independent agents that follow a set of rules which govern behaviors in response to
the environment
• Emergent behavior of the system that results from interactions between individual
agents
• No single control agent that governs the interactions between agents or prescribes
the emergent behavior
Bohorquez et al. [18] and Spagat et al. [19] identify common relationships among
complex conflict systems. Bohorquez et al. identifies trends in insurgent conflicts, which
exhibit power law distributions for both number of casualties and number of attacks per
day. They also find that the number of casualties is converging across insurgent conflicts.
They use a simple model describing organizational dynamics and relate the size of attacks
to group strength.

2.2. MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISION ANALYSIS METHODS
System architecting problems are, except for the simplest systems, multi-objective
decision problems. These problems involve multiple objectives that are evaluated against
competing criteria or constraints. The objectives are typically the result of several desired
system performance attributes for which no single system meets the desired performance.
The criteria describe the set of feasible alternatives, given logical and functional dependencies across the set of alternatives [20].
2.2.1. Quality Function Deployment. QFD is a structured approach for solving
complex systems problems. QFD provides a qualitative assessment and quantitative comparisons for how alternative solutions satisfy customer requirements. The QFD process
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begins with customer needs and captures customer value. Requirements are derived from
the customer and stakeholders; the requirements define what the system must do and are
then prioritized. A typical tool for documenting the QFD is the House of Quality. Using
the requirements generated from elicitation, multidisciplinary teams identify alternative approaches to satisfying these requirements. The approaches are given a qualitative rating of
how well the requirements are satisfied, and relationships among the solution alternatives
are rated based upon dependence or conflict relationships. The results of the QFD process
enable trade-space exploration by comparing the relative performance of each alternative,
identifying requirements that are weakly or insufficiently satisfied and ranking each solution alternative. A rigorous QFD assessment further enables requirements traceability and
subsystem design exploration through hierarchical matrices [21].
2.2.2. TOPSIS. The technique for ordered preference by similarity to the ideal solution (TOPSIS) is a quantitative multi-criteria decision making approach. TOPSIS allows
the decision maker to compare alternatives to a positive ideal solution (the best conceivable alternative) and a negative ideal solution (the worst conceivable alternative). Decision
attribute value is normalized and weighted according to decision maker preferences. Each
alternative is evaluated based on its distance to the positive ideal (di+ ) and negative ideal
(di ) solutions:
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where the value of each alternative against each attribute is vi j and v+j and v+j correspond to the postive and negative ideal solution values for attribute j.
2.2.3. Fuzzy Inference System. Many complex systems engineering problems
tend to be quite ambiguous, especially those with complex stakeholder environments. Am-
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biguity arises in system performance measures. Fuzzy logic is a method to handle such
ambiguity that uses fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets, unlike set theory, allow degrees of membership
to membership functions. Singh and Dagli [22] use fuzzy inference systems to assess SoS
performance using fuzzy attributes. Fuzzy rules are used for performance attributes, and
these attributes are evaluated using a genetic algorithm that represents a system architecture.
2.2.4. Swing Weight Matrix. Value-focused thinking has been recognized for its
applicability in multi-objective decision analysis and provides a way to assess multiple systems providing similar functionality [23, 24]. Parnell and Trainor [25] state that the goal of
architecture development for precedented systems is to improve the system by enabling the
system to better satisfy stakeholder values, ideally expressed as the multiple criteria that
comprise formal MOEs. A comprehensive architecture analysis should consider stakeholder values, subsystem and component attributes and the operational environment which
influences system performance. Parnell and Trainor [25] and Cilli and Parnell [26] investigated trades associated with ISR payloads, patrol craft range and endurance, and network
centric concepts of information reach and quality by developing a trade study framework
using swing weights to assess system performance. This framework follows the steps:
1. Define system objectives and measures in the fundamental objectives hierarchy
2. Develop value functions to map objectives and measures into a value (or utility)
space
3. Develop the swing weight matrix by defining objective importance and measuring
the range in value (swing) across all alternatives
4. Generate creative alternatives that satisfy system objectives and measures
5. Assess alternatives using deterministic analysis by scoring each alternative according
to the swing weight matrix
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6. Summarize results through graphs of objective measures versus performance (value)
7. Perform sensitivity analysis using probabilistic analysis and stochastic simulation
8. Communicate tradeoffs to stakeholders and decision makers
The swing weight matrix is used for complex decision problems that arise in trade
studies. With large numbers of stakeholders, the complexity of the objectives also grows.
The swing weight matrix allows alternative system architectures to be assessed in this
environment, and also offers a method of communicating the results to decision makers.
Swing weights are used to account for the variation in performance measures as well as the
relative importance of each objective and measure to the decision. Table 2.1 presents the
swing weight matrix. Objectives are given a weight corresponding that corresponds to the
importance of the capability (columns) and measure variability (rows).
The swing weight matrix uses an additive value model to determine the value of
each alternative. Suppose there are m different alternatives to select from, and n different
attributes to compare. Then
n

v(x j ) = Â wi vi (xi j )

(2.3)

i=1

where v(x j ) is alternative j’s value in terms of all objectives, i = 1, 2, . . . , n is the index
of the attribute measure, xi is the performance value (or score) for attribute measure i and

Table 2.1. A general swing weight matrix structure. The swing weight matrix captures
differences among both the decision criteria importance and measure variation.
Capability Importance
Enabling Critical Defining
High
F
C
A
Variability (Range) Moderate
H
E
B
Low
I
G
D
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wi is the weight given to attribute i. Note that Âni=1 wi = 1 for the additive value model.
The additive value model allows quantitative assessment of the trade-offs among multiple
competing criteria in terms of stakeholder value.

2.3. DRUG TRAFFICKING
Drug trafficking is one of the most prevalent, persistent and widely viewed forms
of illicit trafficking and places a substantial burden on United States’ social, economic and
health institutions. The United States Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
estimates monetary costs of $120 billion in lost productivity, $11 billion in healthcare, and
$61 billion in criminal justice costs [27]. The United States (US) has invested significant
resources to develop systems that support counter-drug trafficking efforts and other interventions to thwart these impacts.
2.3.1. Chronology of Drug Trafficking. The drug trade has evolved over the last
fifty years. Hyland [28] and Chindea [29] provide detailed descriptions of how these
changes emerged in response to domestic and international policy. These changes include
the trafficking routes and methods of moving drugs from South America into the US, and
organizational structure changes in response to law enforcement and legal framework advances, and as competition among drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) grew.
Current counter-drug trafficking efforts involve a complex system that relies on
muliple US and partner country organizations, intelligence, surveillance and reconaissance
assets, and interdiction resources that span federal, state and local law enforcement agencies [30, 31]. Further, DTOs themselves are a complex system comprised of multiple organizations, each with unique goals and objectives, different functional roles and performance
capabilities. These groups work together, largely through a network of semi-autonomous
agents, to profit from the sale of illegal drugs in the US and Europe [32, 33, 34]. There
is no uniform consensus regarding a well defined structure for DTO organizational structures over time. Rather, these groups tend to self-organize in response to the environment.
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Trafficking objectives, competition for the drug trade, and law enforcement activity comprise this environment. Key trafficking objectives such as maximizing profit, minimizing
the likelihood of interdiction and preventing the arrest and prosecution of group leadership
serve as indirect measures of effectiveness for the trafficking system as a whole [35]. To
meet these objectives, groups operate in a spectrum ranging from cooperation to competition with one another, employ tactics that lead to corruption or cooption of law enforcement
and utilize ingenuity to gain an operational advantage in moving drugs from South America
to the US. The tactics, techniques and procedures used to maximize system level measures
of effectiveness (MOEs) are influenced by values held by the organization. The values
differ among DTOs, as demonstrated by the use of violence in Mexico and Colombia [36].
Hyland [28] and Corcoran [37] identify four periods over the last century that typify
the changing organizational structures and operational practices of DTOs. The following
Sections summarize these periods and the changes that occurred [28, 37].
Drug trafficking in the Americas dates to the late 19th century. The origins of narcotics trafficking began with medical and scientific discoveries in the late 19th century. At
the time, some narcotics (e.g. cocaine) were not regulated or criminalized as were marijuana and opium. Legitimate trade markets formed for cocaine, bolstering the economies
of supplier countries such as Peru. At the same time, illegal narcotics were trafficked primarily by opportunistic individuals acting in self interest.
The criminalization of cocaine in the latter part of this period negatively impacted
coca suppliers in South America, resulting in poor economic conditions in regions once
booming with opportunity. However, demand for such products remained steady in the
US and some European countries, providing an opportunity for illicit trafficking which
developed throughout Latin America and Mexico. During this time, government officials
in these regions realized the opportunity to profit from colluding with local traffickers,
resulting in a culture of corruption.
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The period after World War II gave rise to better structured organizations that focused on geographic specialization, which led to an initial surge in drug-trade related violence. The international community largely criminalized the use and trafficking of coca
at this time, causing trafficking organizations to emerge in unstable regions in South and
Latin America.
These organizations developed areas of specialization, including production, distribution and smuggling, that allowed them to take advantage of their location and indigenous
capabilities. Cuba became one of the distribution centers as a metropolitan city and intermediate destination from South America to the US and Europe.
Toward the end of this period, the Cuban Revolution disrupted the drug trade, causing traffickers to move distribution operations to Central America and Mexico, which introduced trafficking to Mexican political and social structures. Well funded, the DTOs of
this era capitalized on novel technologies, such as aircraft, to transport drugs into the US.
The demand for marijuana and cocaine surged during the 1960s to 1980s, creating
lucrative opportunities for DTOs. As a result of US and Mexican efforts to curb marijuana
production and distribution, Colombia emerged as a new haven for production and distribution hub for the drug. This was fueled by experience in historical trade of illicit goods
and political instability in the region.
During this period, DTOs became much larger and well organized, typically exhibiting a hierarchical structure through the emergence of cartels. Production, trafficking
and security operations were often bolstered by seasonal workers. At this time, Medellín,
Colombia emerged as a trafficking hub and turned the distribution and smuggling activities
into large logistics operations. The Caribbean emerged as a key transit route for drugs entering Miami and south Florida. Smugglers used cigarette boats (go-fast boats) and small
aircraft to transit this route.
Toward the latter part of this era, cartels sought refuge in other Latin American
countries as a result of Colombian and US pressure. These moves allowed the cartels to
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establish new relationships with other traffickers specializing in other commodities and
drugs. These established DTOs had reliable routes through Central America and Mexico
into the US.
Mexican DTOs emerged as the principle traffickers since the 1980s. The changing nature of the social and political environment contributed to the dissolution of cartels
and their hierarchical structure. In response to law enforcement operations and judicial
prosecutions, the organizational structures flattened, evolving into a network of specialized
actors. This structure insulates key members from highly visible edge operations where
law enforcement interdictions are likely to occur. In addition, these groups specialize in
trafficking, coordinating production with other Latin American groups, and distribution in
the US with US-based gangs. This structure allows the network to capitalize on localized
control and areas of specialization while minimizing full network exposure to law enforcement detection and interdiction.
Drug related violence has risen sharply throughout Mexico since 2009. This violence stems from fighting among Mexican DTOs in efforts to control large, strategic geographic sections along the US–Mexico border. This allows DTOs to control the flow of
illicit goods across the border. As the demand for illicit goods continues abroad, Mexican
DTOs have identified new routes across the Atlantic to satisfy the demand.
Key transit corridors have emerged to allow DTOs to continue to bring drugs into
regional distribution centers within the US. Mexican DTOs have adapted their commodities
beyond drugs, and now move people (human smuggling) and other profitable contraband.
As these illicit goods are brought north into the US, bulk cash and weapons are trafficked
south into Mexico, allowing these organizations to continue their operations. Figure 2.1
depicts the estimated cocaine flows across each sector of the transit zone. The transit zone
is comprised of approximately 6,000,000 square miles of open water. Asset capabilities to
detect activities across this expanse are limited.
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Figure 2.1. Trafficking routes across the Transit Zone. Adapted from United States Government Accountability Office [38].

2.3.2. Trafficking as a Complex System. The evolution of DTOs and countertrafficking organizations are integrated throughout their history. Each system architecture
adapted in response to changes implemented by the other. This is evident as countertrafficking efforts closed gaps in one area, DTOs identified new opportunities elsewhere as
they sought to profit from the demand of their illicit goods.
This artifact of coevolution is present in many complex systems, and remains a
challenge to fully characterize and understand in even simpler systems [39, 40].
Thomas [41] provides a description of a recent counter-drug trafficking operation.
Table 2.2 summarizes seizures that occurred during operation Panama Express. This is
an example of coevolution between DTOs and the counter-trafficking SoS from the late
1990s to 2010. As a result of early interdiction successes, DTOs increasingly relied on
sophisticated transportation methods to defeat counter-trafficking detection and interdic-
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Table 2.2. Drug seizures and interdictions from Operation Panama Express. These seizures
over ten years of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force operation demonstrate changes in smuggling vessel use. Data are from [41].
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Fishing Vessels
3
2
5
8
10
11
11
12
5
3

Go-fasts
7
7
11
10
13
12
17
19
9
11

Semi-submersibles
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
6
6
11

Arrests
46
47
75
103
131
138
127
115
90
95

Cocaine (kg)
23,960
12,955
35,446
25,748
58,997
50,994
45,907
46,114
32,834
23,018

tion capabilities. The United States Coast Guard, the lead US law enforcement agency
for maritime drug interdiction, focused substantial assets on the US Virgin Islands and
Puerto Rico [38]. This shift in asset allocation occurred in response to perceived spillover
violence in these US territories as DTOs used these locations as transfer points for entry
into the US, but likely limited the maritime domain awareness for larger transit routes.
These characteristics underscore the complexities involved in managing and operating the
complex counter-drug trafficking SoS, as stakeholder values can overtake considerations
of system performance as a whole.
DTO physical architecture also changed during this time period. The limited speed
and large profiles of commercial fishing vessels resulted in a growth in interdictions. Gofast boats took the place of commercial fishing vessels since they could travel at much
greater speed and out-maneuvre traditional US interdiction assets. As a result of this
change in DTO physical architecture, the US responded by deploying helicopters with
airborne use of force capable of interedicting go-fast boats.
Beginning around 2005, the DTO physical architecture changed again with the
growing use of semi-submersible vessels. These vessels evade detection by many counter-
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trafficking surveillance assets. Semi-submersible vessels typically operate 80%-90% submerged. The US responded with new detection technologies to provide surveillance of
these craft. Currently, DTOs use a mix of these trafficking vessels, and have recently deployed fully submersible vessels to carry drugs across the Transit Zone.
As a result of interdiction and prosecution successes of Panama Express, the structure of DTOs changed. Many cartel leaders were captured, and the DTOs changed into
loosely connected logistics chains. These logistics chains, which include buffers to protect key members [28], emphasize the value that decentralized organizations can bring in
addition to offering skill specialization drug trafficking supply chain.
Kenney [36] identifies different organizational structures observed in Latin American DTOs. These structures are broadly described as hierarchical (or wheel) and chain
networks. Each network type offers unique benefits and limitations in managing trafficking
activities, and insulating key group members from investigation or prosecution from law
enforcement. Figure 2.2 presents the hierarchical network and chain structure observed by
Kenney [36].
Physical architecture and organizational structure coevolution are clearly present
between DTOs and the counter-trafficking SoS architecture over the last several decades.
The ability of both to adapt to new tactics, techniques and technologies enables them to
improve the respective system performance for a period of time. Well financed, DTOs
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(a) Hierarchical, or Wheel, DTO Structure

Dispensation

Money
Laundering
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Figure 2.2. DTO organizational structures. These structures are typical of Latin Amercian
drug trafficking organizations, and have changed over time (adapted from Kenney [36]).
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readily adapt using improvised methods to evade detection and avoid interdiction by law
enforcement agencies.
2.3.3. Data Analysis. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) [42]
hosts a research database which contains information on drug interdictions around the
world provided by member states. The database contains records on the interdiction date,
drug type, quantity seized, transportation method and, if known, source country, destination country and interdiction country. The data are available at http://data.unodc.org. A
representative subset of this data is provided in Table 2.3.
Initial data analysis was performed by summarizing the number of interdictions and
total cocaine seized across all sub-regions for each month in years 1998-2012. Figure 2.3
provides a sample result of this analysis. A subset of this data was used for the below modeling effort. This subset included total interdictions for the Caribbean subregion between
the years 1998–2006.
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Figure 2.3. Monthly cocaine seizure summaries from the UNODC dataset. Only the
Caribbean and South America subregions are shown. Note the significant difference in
y scales to show the overall trends in each subregion.

Table 2.3. UNODC drug interdiction data subset. Additional information on date and departing/interdiction country, if known, are
available in the original dataset.
SubRegion
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America

Country
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Argentina
Colombia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Colombia
Bolivia
Bolivia

PlaceOfSeizure
La Paz
Cochabamba
Cochabamba
La Paz
Chuquisaca
Cochabamba
Salta
Jujuy
Buenos Aires
Cochabamba
Santa Cruz
Cochabamba
Santa Cruz
Cochabamba
Buenos Aires
Taraza
Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz
Cochabamba
Cochabamba
MEDELLIN
Cochabamba
Santa Cruz

DrugType
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine
Cocaine
Cocaine
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine Base
Cocaine HCL

Qty (kg) Installation Transportation
26.00
6429.00
6807.00
2660.00
4.00
6051.00
135.66 Vehicle
50.62
0.53
0.76
0.33 Airport
Commcl air
4538.00
6051.00
1.27
3.31
348.22
1513.00
3782.00
1.52
5.99
Commcl air
0.11 Residence Pvt road
9077.00
0.51

Source

Destination

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
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2.4. RELATED RESEARCH
Operations research methods and systems engineering studies have supported decision making for the trafficking problem. These include deterministic analysis methods,
trade studies and simulation experiments. This section reviews these related studies.
2.4.1. Deterministic Analysis Methods. Game theory is suited to problems where
one agent employs one of any number of strategies against a competing agent. Generalizations and extensions to games have been developed to include multiple players, cooperation, limited information, and continuous strategies among others. Two-person zero-sum
games are a special class of games where exactly two agents whose payoffs are in direct
opposition. These two players choose one strategy against the other player in order to maximize (or minimize) some payoff. These games have been extensively studied for network
interdiction problems, where one player must choose some number of arcs to interdict in
order to minimize the flow available to the adversary [43, 44, 45, 46]. In addition, Shieh
et al. [47], Pita et al. [48] have recently implemented game theoretic models for decision
support tools in airport and harbor security operations.
The network interdiction problem considers the allocation of limited surveillance
assets to detect adversary activity. In this problem, described and formulated by Washburn
[49], different types of detection assets m are deployed to monitor a region separated into
n sectors (assuming the physical conditions across these sectors are equivalent, i.e. the
detection rate for each asset type m is equal across all n sectors). Let di j be the detection
rate for an asset of type i 2 m deployed to sector j 2 n. Assuming that all assets monitor

a sector independently, the total detection rate for sector j is Âm
i=1 di j xi j . The network
interdiction problem can be summarized with the following:
• Index use
i2m

: a detection asset type

j2n

: homogeneous (operationally equivalent) sectors for asset deployment
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• Data
bi : the total number of resources of asset type i available to assign
di j : the detection rate of asset i operating in sector j
y j : the probability of detectable actions taking place in sector j
• Decision variables
xi j : the total number of assets of type i to deploy to sector j
v : the total expected detection rate of adversary activity
• Formulation
Washburn provides a linear programming formulation for the surveillance problem
as follows [49]:
maximize v
s.t.

m

Â xi j

i=1
n

Â xi j

j=1

xi j

v

0,

j = 1, . . . , n,

 li ,

i = 1, . . . , m,

0 8 i, j.

• Description
To represent a limited number of deployable assets for each type m, a bounding constraint on xi j is defined as Â j xi j  li , where li is the maximum number of deployable
assets of type i 2 m. The payoff of this matrix game is the average detection rate
n
against the activities across all sectors, represented as A(xy) = Âm
i=1 Â j=1 di j xi j y j

where y j represents the probability that a detectable activity occurs in sector j.
Pan [50] extended the network interdiction problem to consider adversary paths
known probabilistically.
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Search theory is a set of mathematical constructs that aim to provide estimates of
the amount of effort required to detect a target in some search space [51]. Search theory is
used in search and rescue (SAR), naval analyses, and astronomy [52, 53].
In the most general sense, two conditions must be satisfied for a successful search:
the search must be performed in an area that includes the target, and searchers must be
capable of detecting the search object, or target. There are a few key concepts in search
theory that allow estimates of search effectiveness, probability of detection over time and
other measures. In many cases, these solution methods require certain conditions to be
satisfied, such as a stationary target or the absence of benign targets. Lateral range curves
and sweep width are two key concepts in search theory that underpin its use for search
problems. Lateral range curves correspond to the probability of a specified sensor detecting
a specified target. The lateral range is the distance between the sensor and target at the point
of closest approach. The lateral range curve is a probability distribution of detecting a target
at different lateral ranges. The lateral range curve will vary by sensor-target combinations
and environmental factors such as visibility.
“Cookie-cutter” detectors have a lateral range curve defined as follows:

p(x) =

8
>
>
<1.0 if r  R,
>
>
:0.0 if r > R.

(2.4)

where R is the lateral range of the detector and r is the lateral distance between the
target and the detector. The M-beta search model is a generalization of the “cookie-cutter”
detector, where p(x) is a constant value in the interval [0, 1] across the entire lateral range
of the detector [52].
The sweep width is a measure of search effectiveness for a particular sensor. Sweep
width is defined as the area under the lateral range curve:

W=

Z •

•

p(x) dx.

(2.5)
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Search effort is another important concept in search theory. Search effort is the
search area that is capable of being searched by a detector:

Z = WL
= WV T

(2.6)

where Z is search effort, W is sweep width and L is the distance traveled by the
sensor within the search zone, V is the speed of the sensor/detector and T is the amount
of time spent in the search area. Coverage is another important factor in search theory.
Coverage is defined as the ratio of search effort to search area:

C=

Z
A

(2.7)

where C is coverage, Z is search effort, and A is the search zone
2.4.2. Systems Engineering Studies. Ruegger [54] explores the role of network
centric systems to the mission of maritime domain awareness (MDA). He describes a network centric SoS for MDA by using a SoS engineering process, highlights alternative SoS
capabilities and uses SysML and a discrete event network flow model to develop and evaluate the MDA SoS architecture. Ruegger uses a few performance measures to assess overall
SoS performance, including the time to develop a common operating picture and the probability of common operating picture accuracy. The result is an assessment of alternative
architectures focused on data exchange in a networked SoS. One of the key findings of this
research is that in highly distributed networks (a key structure in network centric systems)
communications should occur with reduced delay between any two nodes as long as there
are no bottlenecks due to insufficient bandwidth.
Zorn [55] develops an architecture anlaysis of alternative system architectures for
unmanned maritime systems (UMS). He explores the role of UMS to support United States
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Coast Guard (USCG) missions, including maritime domain awareness, search and rescue,
and counter-trafficking. Zorn develops capability needs for UMS, develops UMS alternative architectures, including unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs) for USCG acquisition,
and performs a feasibility analysis for the implementation of these UMS architectures. The
result is a recommendation for a path forward to developing and acquiring UMS capabilities for the USCG.
Hayes and Paulo [56] use discrete event simulation to assess a naval command and
control (C2) system architecture. This method develops the functional and physical architectures for the system, then assesses different C2 structures in the form of a network,
where functions are allocated to different node types within the network structure. Their
preliminary results demonstrate the trade offs between a decentralized and distributed network structure and highlight the need for additional work in both C2 architecture analysis
and inclusion of other system level performance measures in order to fully assess the differences between the system architecture alternatives.
Bong [57] applies a systems engineering approach to analyze interagency coordination and effectiveness in support of DoD combatant commands. This approach reviews
the functional and physical architectures of successful systems that support interagency
coordination. Bong applies the results to the development of a notional architecture for
an interagency coordination center for the Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center.
Bong demonstrated that the systems engineering process could be successfully applied to
organizations.
Abeto [58] applies the systems engineering process for interagency counter-trafficking
and counter-terrorism efforts in DoD’s European Command (EUCOM). The process includes operational concept development, stakeholder analysis, system objectives and requirements definition, and functional decomposition. The result is a functional architecture that focuses on information sharing across stakeholders and a method to assess system performance as a feedback mechanism to improve system performance. This work
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help policy makers focus on key system interfaces to improve the counter-trafficking and
counter-terrorism efforts by EUCOM.

2.5. SUMMARY
The design and analysis of complex coevolutionary SoS remains an open challenge
in systems engineering. A body of research has explored alternative methods that support assessing SoS. This includes static models of SoS, deterministic analysis methods for
trade studies, and ABMs to simulate SoS. However, this work has not been integrated to
understand the impact of coevolution in the SoS domain.
The counter-trafficking system is an example of a coevolutionary system. This system has adapted to changes in the operational environment over the last several decades.
However, most analyses of this system have focused on deterministic methods to optimize
resource allocation or used traditional systems engineering approaches to evaluate alternatives or improve aspects of the system. Some work has been done to explore the utility of
new capabilities (e.g. UUVs) in the future. Other work has explored evolutionary technological changes in smuggling vessels. These works have not been integrated to explore the
resulting performance degradation as a result of smuggling vessel changes or explored new
architectures in response to these changes.
Existing research provides the basis for an approach to assess complex coevolutionary SoS. This includes trade studies for constituent systems using multi-objective decision
analysis and agent-based modeling to support SoS meta-architecture evaluation.
Coevolution exists in many systems. This thesis demonstrates that it exists in the
counter-trafficking SoS and adapts existing work to measure the impact on the SoS, create
new alternative meta-architectures, and assess performance trades. This is accomplished
by integrating multi-objective decision analysis, deterministic analysis and agent-based
modeling. Multi-objective decision analysis provides an approach to evaluate SoS metaarchitectures by assessing the contribution of constituent systems that provide a specified
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capability through the value of constituent systems to the overall SoS objectives and measures. This results in a set of constituent systems for an initial SoS meta-architecture. Coevolution impacts SoS performance through changes in the operating environment. Agent
based modeling is used to simulate the SoS in representative operational environments that
mimic coevolution between the SoS and its environment. The results of the simulation
allow assessment of the SoS while accounting for evolutionary changes in the SoS architecture, operating environment, and smuggler behavior.
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3. SYSTEM CONCEPTS

A system is a collection of objects that interact to achieve or perform a capability
that individual components cannot perform alone. The International Council on Systems
Engineering (INCOSE) defines systems engineering as “an interdisciplinary approach and
means to enable the realization of successful systems” [59]. The systems engineering process begins with a need for some capability that a collection of components cannot readily
address. Several models have been developed to describe the systems engineering process. In general, the systems engineering process includes iterating through the activities
of assessing, designing, building, and validating the system.
• the process of describing what the objects are to do
• defining the allowable ways it can be done
• identifying alternative ways of doing it
• defining the criteria that govern how well an alternative satisfies the objectives
• assessing the performance of the available alternatives according to these criteria
• recommending an approach
• documenting the design and development of the alternative
• testing system components

3.1. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
The systems engineering process serves as a risk mitigation against failures in challenging development efforts. For monolithic systems, the formal systems engineering process is a collection of activities that have developed over time, refined by experiences in
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increasingly complex and large-scale systems. Ideally, systems engineering maximizes the
benefit to the customer through analysis of the system problem, evaluation of stakeholder
needs, and the assessment, design, development, testing and implementation of the best
solution. The boundaries between systems engineering activities is often fuzzy, and can
require iterative refinements, especially for requirements development and analysis. Figure 3.1 is one model of the systems engineering process including formal deliverables.
Systems engineering is, in essence, a risk mitigation against failed development for
complex engineered systems. The systems engineering process described by Blanchard
and Fabrycky [21] is summarized in Sections 3.1.1–3.1.4.
3.1.1. Conceptual Design. The conceptual design phase is a critical step in the
systems engineering process. This phase sets the design and implementation trajectory for
all later steps. Errors or mistakes made early on in the systems engineering process heavily influence downstream activities. The conceptual design phase should strike a balance
between concepts that are too narrow, missing key requirements and design alternatives,
and concepts that are too broad, which can push design refinement to further phases, risking project schedule and budget. The following activities are performed during system
conceptual design:
• Need Identification and Problem Definition: The systems engineering process begins
with the identification of a needed capability, which can arise for both new capabilities (and hence a need for new systems), and for precedented systems, in which
improved performance is required. It is important to document the need and reasons why the specific capability is necessary. This informs the system requirements,
stakeholder analysis and conceptual design activities which will influence the overall
system design and implementation.
• System Planning and Architecting: System planning activities develop formal documentation, including a program management plan, systems engineering management
plan, development of technical requirements. Systems architecting activities include
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Figure 3.1. A model of the Systems Engineering process with deliverables. The Conceptual
Design phase is emphasized, and formal deliverables are highlighted by shaded boxes.

development of the functional architecture, the physical architecture (mapped to the
functional architecture), operational requirements definition, development of alternative concepts, and performing feasibility studies of these concepts.
• Conceptual Design and Feasability Analysis: The conceptual design phase identifies
alternative system concepts that address the stated system need and evaluates these
concepts against important stakeholder criteria. These criteria typically include system performance, effectiveness, sustainment and life-cycle cost considerations. The
result is a recommended system concept that best meets the stated need.
The analysis of system alternatives results in major decisions that are made and heavily influence the resulting work to bring the system into being. The considerations
that go into these analyses are problem dependent. Weather considerations impact alternatives designed to operate in outdoor environments, obsolescence considerations
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impact technology development and deployment systems, and data communication
standards impact network systems. Systems that encounter each of these scenarios
should plan and account for all of them. These decisions can have immense impact on the performance, behavior, and ultimately, the utility of the system that is
developed to address the need.
• Requirements Definition: The requirement definitions, specifically the operational
requirements definition activity, identifies the missions the system is expected to
perform, key performance parameters, deployment and distribution estimates, lifecycle considerations, utilization requirements, effectiveness factors, and environmental
factors. For systems-of-systems, interoperability requirements are also addressed.
• Maintenance and Support Concepts: System operation and support are often the
most costly activities for developed systems. The system maintenance and support
concepts identify how the system will be maintained once it is developed and in
operational use. This includes levels of maintenance, organizational responsibilities
and maintenance support activities.
• Measures of Effectiveness: Qualitative measures that describe how well the system
meets its intended purpose. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are provided by the
acquirer or user of the system to describe the operational effectiveness of the solution [59].
• Measures of Performance: Quantitative measures that describe how well the system
meets the required functionality; measures of performance (MOPs) characterize the
physical and functional attributes relevant to system operation [59]
• Technical Performance Measures: Technical performance measures (TPMs) are quantitative measures that specify the standard, or threshold, against which a requirement
should be met. TPMs typically result from operational requirements and describe
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the performance of system components to ensure that they meet system requirements [59].
• Functional Analysis: Functional analysis explores what the system is to do. There
are a number of functional decomposition methods and tools, including integrated
definition (IDEF) modeling and functional flow block diagrams.
• Trade-off Analyses: System level trades evaluate alternatives with regard to technical
performance measures and system level objectives. The result is a recommendation
for a set of perferred alternatives given objectives and constraints. At the system
level, these are typically multi-objective decision problems.
• System Specification: The above conceptual design activities contribute overall guidance for how the system is brought to be. The system specification isa formal document describing how conceptual design elements are combined and integrated to
specify the system.
• Conceptual Design Review: A formal review to evaluate the system specifiation and
conceptual design. This review allows statkeholders to provide recommendation for
correction before progress to preliminary design.
3.1.2. Preliminary System Design. The focus of this phase is to allocate requirements to subsystems and describe the interfaces between subsystems. The goal is to reduce
the abstraction of conceptual design prior to detail system design. Steps of preliminary system design include:
• Preliminary Design Requirements: Preliminary requirements describe what the subsystems are to do.
• Preliminary Design Specifications: This includes specifications for Development,
Product, Proces and Materials. These are formal documents detailing the technical
requirements and design standards.
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• Subsystem Functional Analysis and Allocation: Subsytem function and interfaces
are assigned to subsystems. Models such as functional flow block diagrams are often
used.
• Preliminary Design Criteria: These criteria describe how the “–ility” design considerates are to be addressed.
• Design Engineering Activities: These activities call for an increased role of design
engineering disciplines within integrated teams.
• Trade-off Studies and Design Definition: This inlucdes evaluation of alternative
subsystem configurations and establishing a system configuration at the component
level.
• Preliminary Design Review: A formal review of the preliminary design with stkeholders. This allows recommendations or adjustments before moving to detailed
system design.
3.1.3. Detail Design and System Development. This phase includes the detailed
design of system components and interfaces. The following are elements of detailed design
and system development:
• Detail Design Requirements: The lowest level requirements that the system must
satisfy are allocated to components.
• System Integration: Ensures the collection of components operate together as a system, and that the system meets performance objectives and satisfies system-level
requirements.
• System Development: This includes prototype development, iterations through design reviews, and includes evaluation and feedback reviews.
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3.1.4. System Test and Validation. The purpose of system test and validation is
to ensure that the system operates as designed and satisfies operational and performance
requirements. This phase includes test and evaluation planning and reporting to validate
that the system meets these requirements.

3.2. ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS
Architecture analysis is among the first activities that solidify the abstract notions
described by the system need and system concept. It enables trade-space exploration, accounts for multiple stakeholder objectives, and forms a systematic set of views of the system [60]. Systems engineering has a strong influence on the overall design and direction of
the system during the conceptual design stages, where architecture analysis is performed
(Figure 3.2).

High

Systems
Engineering

Design Influence

Design Discipline
Engineering

Low
Conceptual
Design

Preliminary
Design

Detail Design
and Development

Figure 3.2. The influence of systems engineering and design disciplines in overall system
design. Early systems engineering design phases have tremendous influence in the overall
system design. System architecture development is a key task in developing a successful
system concept. Adapted from Blanchard and Fabrycky [21].
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3.2.1. DoD Architecture Framework. The DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF)
is an overarching model that supports decision making in DoD organizations [61]. The
DoDAF provides a common definition for system architecture development. A standardized set of models, or views, enable information to be shared across DoD organizations to
communicate effectively. The DoDAF view families include:
• All Viewpoint provides a summary for the scope, constraints, and assumptions used
to develop the system architecture views
• Capability Viewpoint describes the capability taxonomy and visualizations of capability evolution
• Data and Information Viewpoint defines the business and operational information
rules and requirements
• Operational Viewpoint describes the tasks and activities and resources required to
carry out the operational aspects of the system
• Project Viewpoint provides information on the organizations, programs and projects
involved in developing the required capabilities
• Services Viewpoint describe the resources that support the operational and support
capabilities of the system
• Standards Viewpoint defines the rules for the configuration and relationships between elements of the architecture description to ensure operational and capability
requirements are met
• Systems Viewpoint describes the systems and interconnections necessary to support
operational activities and information exchange across system components
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3.2.2. Role of Modeling and Simulation. Models support decision making and
are constructed based on the specific decisions they are intended to support. Simulations
execute models over time and space to understand the behaviors that result from interactions between system components.
Modeling and simulation are used throughout the systems decision process [20].
This includes problem definition (conceptual models), solution design (cost analysis), decision making (risk and trade analysis) and solution implementation (system control and
logistics). Simulation is used within the systems decision process, such as discrete event
simulation for assessing operational factors of the system, and physics-based simulations
that model the physics of system comopnents, such as communications in electronics components or probability of detection for radar systems.

3.3. ENGINEERING COMPLEX SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS
A system-of-systems is a system composed of multiple subsystems [59], called constituent systems. Systems-of-systems typically involve complex stakeholder environments
as a result of some degree of autonomy of each sub-system owner. As a result, the system
architect or system engineer is constrained not only by the existing performance, maturity
or technological capabilities of constituent systems, but by organizational and policy challenges as well. In these environments, the SoS missions can become secondary or tertiary
roles for constituent systems. However, the SoS mission requires the constituent systems
to gain some performance advantage.
The traditional systems engineering process is well suited for monolithic systems.
In these cases, the environment does not substantially change and diminish system performance after it is deployed into the operational environment. Systems-of-systems differ
from monolithic systems in a few ways. Parnell et al. [20] identify several trends that create
challenges in applying traditional systems engineering to complex SoS. These challenges
are a result of increasing:
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• Complexity due to engaging increasing numbers of engineering disciplines and growth
in the types and number of interfaces
• Dynamics due to interactions with, and changes in, the environment
• Stakeholders that contribute input and have unique objectives for the system
• Security and Privacy Concerns as a result of the amount of information stored, accessed and available through interconnected systems
A number of characteristics help distinguish monolithic systems from SoS (Table 3.1). Sage and Cuppan [62] identify these as operational and managerial independence
of the constituent systems, geographic distribution (networked systems), emergent behavior and evolutionary development. Sage and Cuppan identify that SoS exhibit aspects of
complex adaptive systems, and may require federated systems engineering principles and
evolutionary acquisition approaches to address the complexity inherent in SoS. However,
systems-of-systems integrate constituent systems to enable new capabilities for a particular
mission or purpose. This has, in many cases, changed the system development perspective
from requirements based to capabilities based [63].
Bar-Yam [65] describes recent challenges in applying the traditional systems engineering process for complex SoS and provides a description of the differences between
traditional SE and SE for modern complex systems. For example, the NASA systems engineering process does not account for drastically changing operating environments — the
requirements do not change. Current SoS have asynchronous development cycles for each
constituent system. A current challenge is integrating these constituents over time to realize the desired set of capabilities for the SoS. Systems developed throughout the Cold War
provide examples of changing architectures. These systems were developed in anticipation
of adversary response. The goal in such systems is to assess how best to respond to uncertain futures by focusing on the behavior that we are concerned with. Network centric
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Table 3.1. Characteristics of monolithic systems and acknowledged SoS. Characteristics
are adapted from [63] and [64].
Environment
Scope

Monolithic System
Fixed or known

Stakeholders

Clearly defined

Organization
Management

Hierarchical; centralized
Formal roles; funded scope

Operational Focus

Conceived, designed and developed to meet operational
objectives
Documented requirements
and milestones; SE process
Usually performed bottom
up; planned test phases

Acquisition
Evaluation

Boundaries

Includes system components

Interfaces

Component-component
interfaces
Clear, unambiguous and
measurable
performance
measures
System behavior is deterministic

Performance

Behavior

Evolution

Planned; version controlled

System Development

Systems engineering process

Acknowledged SoS
Varies with availability of constituent systems
and operating environment
Differences between SoS and constituent systems with competing objectives
Networked; decentralized or autonomous
Independent funding and development of
constituent systems
Needed to satisfy operational objectives that
may not align with constituent system objectives
Independent development; coordination between novel, new and legacy systems
Challenges due to availability and technological maturity (synchronization) of constituent
systems; potential for unintended consequences; continuous testing with changes in
constituent systems
Includes systems that contribute to the SoS;
changing operational environment
Enable control, information and data flow;
balance constituent system needs
Capabilities that rely on contribution of constituent systems
Uncertainties introduced as a result of constituent system availability; systems working
together for a particular capability
Largely uncoordinated; opportunities by reduced capability from changing missions or
operating environment
An unsolved engineering challenge

systems and modern combat systems are other examples where traditional SE needs to be
extended to address inherent complexity.
One of the challenges in SoS is evolutionary development. Planning for new capabilities is a challenge as a result of future uncertainty regarding the operating environment
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Figure 3.3. A model of asynchronous development in a SoS. The acknowledged SoS development concept begins with a needed capability and identified constituent systems. The
constituent systems undergo independent development and evolution which lead to asynchronous SoS development and integration. This represents a key challenge that separates
engineering SoS from traditional systems engineering for monolithic systems.

and availability of capabilities. Figure 3.3 illustrates the changes and adaptions of the
SoS by incremental changes in constituent systems. The SoS is initiated with planned
constituent systems. The constituent systems undergo development and evolution independently, which leads to asynchronous SoS development and integration. These challenges
are examples of the difference between SoS analysis and traditional, monolithic systems
engineering analysis. Fang and DeLaurentis [66] use an approximate dynamic planning
approach to optimize the iterative SoS development process based on cost, schedule, performance and risk. This supports SoS architecture decision making by recommending
alternatives at each iteration that SoS managers can consider for implementation.
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Meilich [67] reviews some challenges in applying traditional systems engineering
to the SoS environment. Meilich also identifies that, given current trends toward complex SoS, considerations such as flexibility, adaptability, and interoperability with systems
or capabilities that were not envisioned early in the system development are becoming
increasingly important. This contrasts with monolithic systems, for which optiming the
system for a particular purpose tends to be an objective for the system engineer. Meilich
notes that experimenting with the SoS as it evolves is one way to address the complex
behavior that emerges from the SoS. This requires modeling and simulation tools to assess SoS adaptations in the environment in order to generate insights for planning future
capabilities.
However, simulating complex SoS, including the constituent systems, interrelationships and environment interactions, is an open challenge Kewley et al. [68] develop
federated simulations for a SoS. Federated simulations, including distributed interactive
simulation (DIS) and high level architecture (HLA), allow interoperability between models that have developed at varying levels of detail using a defined interface. The federated
simulations developed by Kewley et al. use federates for information exchange, environment representation, entity representation, model development and data collection applied
to a swarm of semi-autonomous unmanned aircraft systems. The goal of this work is to
develop improved rules governing the behavior of the SoS constituents. Baldwin et al. [69]
suggest that agent based modeling is well suited for general SoS simulation. However,
agent based models can be challenging to validate empirically. Baldwin et al. find that
discrete event simulation supports validation of the agent based model for the SoS.
The test and evaluation process also separates traditional systems engineering from
SoS engineering. Due to asynchronous development of the SoS constituent systems and
coupling of the SoS with the environment, the testing process becomes convoluted. Testing
of SoS constituents can take place with operational systems
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There are several open challenges in engineering systems-of-systems. These challenges include evaluating the SoS alternatives at the SoS level, and generating feasible
alternatives for the SoS:
1. Evaluating SoS alternatives at the SoS level requires that the interfaces between each
SoS constituent system may be well defined in terms of the physical, functional and
communication layers. However, understanding the interdependencies between the
systems that comprise the SoS, especially with respect to changes in performance, is
much less understood. In essence, these interdependencies can exhibit force multiplier effects, where systems that serve similar, but distinct, functions, work in tandem
to generate an improved overall performing architecture. This is an example of nonlinearity resulting from SoS capabilities and interfaces.
2. Generating feasible alternatives is an unsolved problem in engineering SoS. This is
a combinatorial problem in the SoS case, where each combination of constituent
systems becomes an SoS alternative.
In the architecture evaluation for a single system, trade studies compare several
alternatives in order to choose a single best alternative in terms of overall system performance, expressed through MOEs, MOPs and TPMs (or collectively, a value model). For
the SoS case, we may seek to employ multiple alternatives due to reliance on these systems
for other missions. In the case of drug interdiction, USCG surveillance aircraft are used for
other missions beyond surveillance of drug traffickers. Search and rescue missions are a
greater priority when loss of life or property are at stake. Similarly, US Navy vessels serve
to provide national level defense capabilities that are required in times of conflict. These
platforms are equipped with a variety of other technologies and equipment to support the
national defense mission.
A meta-architecture represents the constituent systems within the SoS. This representation defines the relationships between the constituent systems, oriented toward a
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desired SoS capability, and based on individual capabilities of the SoS constituents. The
interfaces between constituent systems typically are in the form of communications interfaces. However, other interfaces, including physical interfaces, can also be important in
situations where one system depends on the other. For example, when one system depends on another in order to be delivered to the operating environment, the payload of
the delivery system becomes a consideration given the volume and weight of the delivered
system [70, 71].
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4. THE COUNTER-TRAFFICKING SOS

The counter-trafficking SoS exists to detect trafficking activities and disrupt these
activities through supply reduction, smuggling interdiction and trafficker prosecution. This
requires the coordination of several geographically dispersed systems that operate together.
These systems support resource planning, information sharing, detection and interdiction
operations, and coordination with law enforcement for trafficker prosecution.
The counter-trafficking system is an example of a system-of-systems. Table 4.1
describes the stakeholders involved in this SoS. Each stakeholder has a role in the countertrafficking effort, but none exist solely to detect and interdict drug trafficking between
South America and the US. Each stakeholder has slightly different values and performance
measures to assess counter-trafficking performance, and each brings unique capabilities to
the counter-trafficking mission.
The counter-trafficking SoS has many characteristics of an acknowledged SoS:
• several stakeholders with differing objectives at the SoS and constituent levels (Table 4.1),
• constituent systems that participate in the SoS and other, unrelated missions,
• constituent systems that contribute required SoS capabilities,
• a decentralized management structure, with organizational efforts combined to satisfy the overall counter-trafficking SoS goals and objectives,
• constituent systems developed asynchronosly under differing management and systems engineering structures,
• interfaces centered on information sharing across constituent systems and associated
organizations,
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Table 4.1. Stakeholders of the counter-trafficking SoS. Many stakeholders are users or
operators of the system. Some functions are shared, but tailored for specific missions. US
policy and law control the roles, responsibilities and jurisdictions of US organizations.
Agency

Role or Function

Department of Defense
(USSOUTHCOM)

Performs monitoring and detection of trafficking
activities; provide support to law enforcement interdiction operations
Performs interagency and international coordination for detection and monitoring; resource allocation; facilitates interdiction of illicit trafficking
and other threats in support of national and partner nation security.
Interdiction vessels, ISR asset support [38]

JIATF-South

United States Navy
Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast
Guard
Customs and Border
Protection
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
Intelligence Community
Department of State
Department of Justice
Drug
Enforcement
Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Partner Countries
State and Local Law Enforcement

Maritime surveillance and interdiction
Land and maritime border drug interdiction

Goals and Objectives
Targeted number of
interdictions [72]

Reduce the flow of
cocaine [73]
Sustain
desired
readiness rate [73]

Interdiction support
Drug related intelligence [74]
Coordination with partner countries [74]
Prosecution [30]
Drug related intelligence and interdiction [41]
Drug related intelligence and interdiction [41]
ISR and interdiction; asset and resource deployment [38]
Drug interdiction; intelligence; prosecution [30]

• opportunistic SoS development; architecture is incrementally developed based on the
availability of tools and platforms
Based on these characteristics, the counter-trafficking SoS can be considered an
acknowledged SoS.
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A key counter-trafficking effort is the interdiction of cocaine and other illicit drugs
in the transit zone. Cocaine typically moves from South America, through the western
Pacific Ocean or Caribbean Sea, to Central America and the United States. The ONDCP
estimates that 84% of illicit drugs were moved across the transit zone using noncommercial
maritime means in fiscal year 2013 [38]. Drug trafficking organizations use different types
of vessels to smuggle narcotics across the transit zone. Table 4.2 identifies a few categories
of these vessels and their characteristics.
The United States Coast Guard is the lead US organization for executing maritime
counter-trafficking efforts in the transit zone. The Joint Interagency Task Force - South
(JIATF-South) coordinates the activities of several organizations to support these efforts.
The USCG, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and USN contribute vessels and aircraft. JIATF-South also receives resources and support from partner countries, including
the United Kingdom and Canada. The US effort to disrupt the drug supply focuses elements
of the counter-trafficking SoS close to the source of drug supply to maximize interdiction
opportunities of higher-value cargo loads. Due to the Posse Comitatus Act, DoD is prohibited from engaging in civilian law enforcement. As a result, USCG personnel are assigned
to certain USN vessels in order to perform law enforcement functions in drug interdiction
areas [38, 73, 75].

Table 4.2. Maritime smuggling vessel properties. These DTO maritime smuggling vessels
are encountered in the Transit Zone. These vessels have differing speeds, ranges, payloads
and detection and evasion capabilities that are unique to each type of vessel. The values of
these characteristics are estimated for each smuggling vessel type.
Name

Domain

Fishing Vessel
Go-fast Boat
Semi-Submersible
Fully Submersible

Sea
Sea
Sea
Sea

Range
(nm)
3,000
400
2,000
2,000

Payload (metric
tons)
5–10
0.5–3
3–10
3–10

Speed
(knots)
12
70
10
10

Cost
$100,000
$300,000
$500,000
$900,000
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4.1. SOS ARCHITECTURE
The counter-trafficking SoS uses existing DoD and DHS systems to provide the
necessary capabilities to perform the counter-trafficking mission. The engineering challenge for this SoS is to improve how these systems operate in order to maximize the amount
of smuggled drugs and other contraband being trafficked into the US. In order to do this,
it is important to understand the required capabilities of the counter-trafficking SoS, the
systems that can be used to provide those capabilities, and how those systems can be integrated and operated to maximize SoS effectiveness. The following sections describe the
set of capabilities and functions of the SoS, the physical architecture in terms of constituent
systems that satisfy teh capabilities, and an operational view of how the system works today. The definition of these systems begins with a functional decomposition of what these
systems do, defining and assessing the relationships that exist between system functions.
4.1.1. Capabilities and Functional Architecture. In systems engineering, a functional architecture describes what the system is to do. For SoS, missions specify what the
SoS is to do, and capabilities are derived from those missions. The mission of the countertrafficking SoS is to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs, typically cocaine, into the US. The
capabilities for the counter-trafficking SoS are provided in Figure 4.1 [76]. The remainder
of this research omits the capabilities shaded in grey because they are considered supplementary to the primary focus of the counter-trafficking SoS system studied here.
• Detect Smuggler: Detecting the smuggler consists of the following capabilities:
– Detect Smuggling Vessels: The counter-trafficking SoS must be able to detect
smuggling vessels in order to allocate resources and understand the operating
environment. Without detection, the counter-trafficking mission cannot be performed.
– Identify Smuggling Vessels: Smuggling vessels typically operate in areas where
commercial and some recreational traffic are also located. Smugglers use fish-

49

Disrupt Drug
Production

Minimize Harvesting
Areas

Detect Coca Farms
…

Minimize Production

Detect Production Facilities
Seize Production Facilities
…

Minimize Distribution

Detect Distribution Warehouses
…

Detect Smuggling Vessels
Detect Smugglers
Perform
CounterTrafficking
Mission

Identify Smuggling Vessels
Track Smuggling Vessels
Disseminate Information

Disrupt
Smuggling
Deploy Interdiction Systems
Coordinate ISR
Interdict Smugglers

Identify Target
Track Target
Execute Interdiction
Recover Interdiction Systems

Disrupt
Trafficking
Organizations

Apprehend Traffickers
…

…
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…

Figure 4.1. Counter-trafficking SoS capabilities. These capabilities include disruption of
drug crop harvesting, smuggling, and drug trafficking organizations. Each of these capabilities is decomposed to identify the systems and platforms that provide those capabilities
in order to perform the counter-trafficking mission. Capabilities shaded grey are not considered in the remainder of the SoS analysis.

ing vessels to blend in with the environment. Smugglers have also used sailboats and yachts to traffick drugs. The ability to identify smuggling vessels
from benign traffick is necessary to reduce the number of false positive identifications, which reduces the availability of valuable assets.
– Track Smuggling Vessels: In order to coordinate smuggler interdiction, targets
must be tracked spatiotemporally. This requires that detection assets have visibility of targets over a period of time.
– Disseminate Information: The coordination of detection and interdiction assets
is an important aspect. Information on targets allows targets to be prioritized
and interdiction resources to be organized. Information dissemination is also
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an important feature in the broader counter-trafficking mission, since different
organizations likely have access to different types of information, as well as the
engagement and coordination of activities with partner countries.
• Interdict Smugglers: The interdiction of smugglers is also necessary to successfully
disrupt drug trafficking. Interdiction capabilities include:
– Deploy Interdiction Systems: Interdiction assets must be able to physically
access the target vessel. This requires some deployment capability or platform
that can place these assets within range of the target.
– Coordinate ISR: Coordination of ISR enables the information disseminated
from the detection systems to be used by the interdiction systems. The timelineness and availability of this information is critical for successful interdictions.
– Identify Target: Smuggling vessels may be in proximity to other types of vessels. The capability to hand-off the target from the detection system to the interdiction system may be accomplished through visual means, or may require
additional identification capabilities. The purpose of this capability to to ensure
that the correct vessel is interdicted.
– Track Target: Once the target is identified, it must be tracked in order for interdiction assets to physically interdict the vessel. This may be accomplished
through coordination with detection systems that have detected, identified and
tracked the vessel, or may require the interdiction system to track the target
independently.
– Execute Interdiction: Interdiction requires personnel to physicall board the target vessel. In some cases, an additional capability, such as airborne use of
force, may be required. Boarding approaches may depending on the target vessel type.
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– Recover Interdiction Systems: After the interdiction is completed, interdiction
personnel, smugglers and any drugs seized are recovered.
4.1.2. Physical Architecture. Disrupting maritime smuggling is a key focus of
the counter-trafficking effort, and the focus of the remainder of this research. The capabilities of the counter-trafficking SoS require constituent systems for command and control,
and detection and interdiction. For counter-trafficking, platforms are needed to deploy detection and interdiction assets. The constituent systems available to support these capabilities have varying performance in range, speed, cost and target detection and interdiction.
These systems are coordinated to disrupt smuggling activities of the vessels described in
Table 4.2. Table 4.3 summarizes the amount of time different types of counter-trafficking
SoS constituent systems were used for the counter-trafficking mission in 2013 [38].
• Detection: Detection capabilities include surface search radar, synthetic aperture
radar and visual detection. Intelligence can also contribute to detection, although
the intelligence role is not explored for this analysis. These sensors require a platform to deploy into the operational environment. These platforms typically include
aircraft and surface vessels.
• Identification: Target identification can occur using electro-optical/infrared sensors,
or through visual means. Like detection sensors, the ability to identify targets re-

Table 4.3. Surveillance asset availability. Data are for fiscal year 2013, from United States
Government Accountability Office [38].
Agency
CBP
USN
USN
USCG
USCG

Support Type
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Maritime Patrol Vessels
Cutter Boats (combined)
HC-130

Total
6134
2100
429
1500
3750

Units
Hours
Hours
Days
Days
Hours
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quires aircraft or surface vessel platforms to deploy the sensors in the operating environment.
• Tracking: Vessel tracks are based on target detection. These detection events are
recorded and coordinate through a command and control center. Campos III [77]
describes a method that develops target tracks to generate probability density maps
of the target location over time. This supports the allocation and movement of interdiction assets to the vicinity of the target.
• Surveillance: Surveillance systems are platforms that support detection and tracking
of smuggling vessels. These systems are typically aircraft that can operate for extended periods of time over large geographic areas. These platforms are also used
for other missions. Representative surveillance systems are presented in Table 4.4.
• Interdiction: Systems to support interdiction must be capable of reaching the target
location and conducting the interdiction operation. For some targets, such as evasive
go-fast boats, interdiction can require an additional capability such as airborne use
of force. In this case, the target is immobilized so that interdiction can occur. Other
targets, such as submersibles, can evade current interdiction capabilities by staying
submerged. Interdiction platforms are also used for other missions, such as search
and rescue. Representative interdiction craft are presented in Table 4.5.

Table 4.4. Representative surveillance systems. The counter-trafficking SoS includes additional surveillance systems from other agencies
and organizations.

Organization
Class

Radar
EO/IR
Night Vision
Encrypted Communications
Maximum Speed
(knots)
Cruise Speed, est.
(knots)
Range (nm)
Endurance
(hours)

HC-144A

C-27J

HC-130H

HC-130J

Scaneagle

RQ-4
Hawk

USCG
Medium
Range
Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Multi-mode surface search
Y
Y
Y

USCG
Medium
Range
Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Multi-mode surface search
Y
Y
Y

USCG
Long
Range
Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Multi-mode surface search
Y
Y
Y

USCG
Long
Range
Fixed-Wing Aircraft
Multi-mode surface search
Y
Y
Y

USCG
UAS

USCG
UAS

Y

Y

246

317

380

380

80

112

230

220

374

374

55

70

2000
11

2675
12

2487
14

5000
14

809
24

12300
32

Global
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Table 4.5. Representative interdiction systems. The USCG has primary responsibility for smuggling vessel interdiction in the Transit
Zone, since DoD organizations are prohibited from performing law enforcement operations.

Class

Interception
Capability
Radar
EO/IR
Maximum Speed
(knots)
Cruise Speed, est.
(knots)
Range (nm)
Endurance
(hours)
Launch Platform
Crew (personnel)

MH-60T Jayhawk

MH-65D Dolphin

LRI-II

OTH-IV

RB-S II

RB-M

Medium
Range
Recovery Rotary
Wing
Airborne use of
force;
Y
Y

Medium
Range
Recovery Rotary
Wing
Airborne use of
force;
Y
Y

Long Range Interceptor Boat

Long
Range
Boarding Vessel

Short Range Response Boat

Medium
Range
Response Boat

Sea

Sea

Sea

Sea

180

175

38

40

45

43

150

148

30

30

35

30

700
6.5

290
3

225

200

175
8

250
24

NSC
4

NSC

NSC

NSC

NSC
3

Shore
4
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4.1.3. Operational View. The Operational View (OV) provides a high level context for how the system achieves the intended capability. Figure 4.2 depicts an OV-1 for the
counter-trafficking SoS. Connections between systems represent available communication
interfaces.

Satellite

C2

Airborne
Surveillance

Maritime
Platform

Interdictor

Target

Commercial
Vessel

Figure 4.2. OV-1 of the initial SoS meta-architecture.

4.2. COEVOLUTION OF THE COUNTER-TRAFFICKING SOS
Drug trafficking organizations adapt trafficking modes and methods to circumvent
detection and interdiction capabilities of the counter-trafficking SoS. Complexities such as
the varied stakeholder environment, constituent systems integration, and competing mission priorities make analyzing the counter-trafficking SoS a challenge. A changing operating environment also leads to the complex nature of the counter-trafficking SoS.
Openly available data reporting specific types of trafficking vessels is limited. Table 2.2 provides a small dataset for a single operation that demonstrates one aspect of coevolutionary behavior on the part of DTOs. Between 2005 and 2009, the fraction of seized
semi-submersibles increased from 0% to 44%. This significant increase reflects changing
capabilities on the part of DTOs as well as the counter-trafficking SoS.
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Aggregated Annual Submersible Seizures
1993−2013

Number of Vessels
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Figure 4.3. Submersible seizures between 1993–2013. The number of seized fully- and
semisubmersibles has changed substantially since 1993. Between 2005–2009, the number
of seizures grew significantly, but has declined since. This indicates that DTOs are becoming more proficient in the use of submersibles to evade detection and interdiction by the
counter-trafficking SoS. Data are from Ramirez and Bunker [78].

Ramirez and Bunker [78] describe the evolution of DTO fully- and semi-submersibles
over the last two decades. Figure 4.3 shows the number of seizures reported by Ramirez
and Bunker. The number of submersible seizures has declined in recent years. Ramirez
and Bunker indicate that newer technologies employed by DTOs to evade or outrun current detection and interdiction technologies are driving the decline, rather than reduced use
of these types of smuggling vessels. This means that DTOs have evolved to new forms
of trafficking vessels in response to the capabilities employed by the counter-trafficking
SoS. This exemplifies the idea of coevolution between the counter-trafficking SoS and the
environment.
The counter-trafficking mission involves the implementation and operation of surveillance technologies, command and control nodes and interdiction assets. Similarly, drug
trafficking organizations use transportation methods that have varying cargo capacities,
range and speed of travel. The interactions between the counter-trafficking SoS and drug

57
traffickers result in dynamics influencing the number of drug interdictions. These dynamics
can be viewed as a population of interdictions that changes over time based on probabilities of detection and interdiction, the frequency of smuggling events, and the effectiveness
of counter-trafficking operations. These dynamics exhibit complex system behavior. The
seizure quantity of trafficked drugs approximates the power law distribution. Figure 4.4
displays the power law distributions for the quantity of cocaine seized for each of the threeyear time periods between 1998–2012 (note the differences in x and y scales). The data for
this figure come from the UNODC dataset. Within each period, x corresponds to the drug
seizure quantity for each reported interdiction. N(x) is the number of seizures that exceed
a given quantity x. The logarithms of these values are plotted to represent the power law relationship between x and N(x). Figure 4.4e corresponds to years 2010–2012, and indicates
that something about the relationship between the counter-trafficking SoS and smuggler
activities changed. This data no longer seem to follow the power law distribution. There
are several more seizures of much greater quantities during this time period. There may be
several factors that influence this relationship, but a change in the environment is likely an
important variable.
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Figure 4.4. Power law distributions observed in cocaine seizures from the UNODC drug
interdiction data. Here, x corresponds to the seizure quantity, and N(x) is the number of
interdictions that exceed x. Data from the most recent time period, 2010–2012, indicate
that the SoS and the environment have changed to influence the frequency and size of
interdictions.
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5. ASSESSING COEVOLUTIONARY SOS META-ARCHITECTURES

Systems-of-systems do not operate in isolation. The complexities that arise result from interdependencies between the SoS and its environment. Different modeling
approaches are used to answer different kinds of questions about the performance of the
system. One challenge in systems engineering is enabling model interoperability so that
information from one model can be used by another. DIS and HLA are formal modeling
structures that have been used successfully to answer questions using modeling and simulation across multiple scales. These tools assist the exploration of future operating scenarios
and estimation of candidate system performance against varied adversary capabilities.
The concept of coevolution defines the behavior that results when systems and their
environment each adapt to changes in the other. The system and the environment can
influence the architecture of each other. This means that environmental variables, which the
system and its stakeholders may have no direct influence over, can affect the performance
and future architecture of the SoS. This idea of coevolution and its impact on the SoS is
illustrated in Figure 5.1, a conceptual model of the relationships between a system, the
system architecture and the environment.
Two challenges for understanding how coevolution affects modern complex systems are:
• Understanding the Impact of Changes in the Operating Environment: since SoS do
not operate in isolation, changes in the environment affect the performance of constituent systems, resulting in SoS level performance changes. These changes can
increase or decrease the SoS performance. New constituent system alternatives or
new capabilities must be integrated in the SoS to address performance gaps.
• Evaluating SoS meta-architecture alternatives: the interfaces between each SoS constituent system may be well defined in terms of physical and communication in-
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Figure 5.1. Conceptual model of the coevolutionary counter-trafficking SoS. Interactions
between the SoS and the environment (DTOs) result in adaptations to the capabilities necessary for the SoS to gain a performance advantage. There are several methods that can be
used to model different aspects of these complex interactions.

terfaces. However, understanding the interdependencies between the systems that
comprise the SoS, especially in regards to changes in performance, is much less understood. In essence, these interdependencies can exhibit force multiplier effects,
where systems that provide similar capabilities work in tandem to generate an improved overall performing architecture.
This research demonstrates a method to assess the the impacts of a changing operating environment on constituent system performance. The impacts are used to generate
conceptual architectures that use new constituent systems to address capability gaps. Using
this new meta-architecture, an agent based model is developed to explore the relationship
between SoS meta-architecture and SoS performance under three scenarios.
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In the architecture evaluation for a single system, trade studies compare several
alternatives in order to choose a single best alternative in terms of overall system performance expressed through the objectives hierarchy. For an acknowledged SoS, multiple
alternatives are required due to other mission priorities of the constituent systems. For the
counter-trafficking SoS, USCG surveillance aircraft also perform search and rescue missions, which are likley a greater priority when loss of life or property are at stake. Similarly,
USN vessels provide national level defense capabilities which impacts their availability.
Both of these systems are equipped with technologies and equipment necessary for other
missions.
The SoS architecture analysis considers differences among constituent systems to
optimize the SoS meta-architecture. This meta-archtiecture must include constituent systems that perform well against the full set of smuggling vessels. The SoS must adapt to
smuggling vessel changes, including new vessels and alternative routes, in order to maintain a performance advantage. This research demonstrates an approach for assessing a
complex, acknowledged SoS that experiences this behavior. The following sections describe this approach and apply it to the counter-trafficking SoS.
1. Define SoS objectives and measures in the fundamental objectives hierarchy
2. Apply the trade study framework using swing weights to constituent systems. More
than one constituent system that provides the same capability may be selected in the
SoS meta-architecture.
3. Demonstrate the impact of coevolution by updating the SoS objective values as a
result of changes in the environment. Re-evaluate SoS performance as a result of
these changes.
4. Generate creative alternatives to address capability gaps of the existing SoS metaarchitecture in the new environment
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5. Develop and execute an agent based model to simulate the SoS in the operating
environment
6. Perform experiments to compare performance of the original, impacted and adapted
SoS architecture in varied scenarios
7. Construct statistical models to develop a representative model of the architecture and
performance in uncertain future environments
8. Communicate tradeoffs to stakeholders and decision makers through depictions of
trades associated with alternative SoS meta-architectures to inform research, development and acquisition decisions

5.1. OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES
System objectives and measures (values) are typically elicited from decision makers during formal systems engineering activities: stakeholder analysis, requirements definition and requirements analysis. In general, systems engineering trade studies balance
multiple competing objectives. These objectives often involve affordability, performance,
schedule (for acquisitions) and adaptability considerations.
For this research, the SoS-level objectives are derived from the stakeholder analysis
and capabilities assessment in Chapter 4. The objectives and measures for the countertrafficking SoS are presented in the Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy depicted in Figure 5.2. The description of each objective and measure follows.
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Figure 5.2. SoS fundamental objectives hierarchy. The fundamental objectives are those
attributes most important to stakeholders about how the system performs its essential functions.
• Maximize Detection: This objective maximizes the ability of the alternative to detect
the range of targets present in the environment. The measures for this objective are:
– Maximize Range: the range that a surveillance craft can navigate.
– Maximize Endurance: the amount of time that a surveillance craft can operate
before returning to station.
– Maximize Sweep Width: a measure of search effectiveness.
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– Maximize Search Effort: the amount of search area covered during a single
dedicated search.
– Maximize Availability: availability of the detection asset for use in the countertrafficking mission.
• Maximize Interdiction: This objective maximizes the ability of the alternative to
interdict the range of targets present in the environment. The measures for the Maximize Interdiction objective are:
– Maximize Availability: the availability of the interdiction asset for the countertrafficking mission.
– Maximize Track Speed: the speed at which the interdiction asset can navigate
to the target.
– Maximize Interdiction Capability: the ability of the asset to successfully interdict the target. Some alternatives may not be equipped to physically interdict
certain types of targets.
• Maximize Situational Awareness: This objective maximizes the ability of the information sharing alternative to inform connected systems about the environment. The
measures for this objective are:
– Maximize Information Sharing: information dissemination for relevant information, provided in a timely manner.
– Maximize Coordination: coordinate resources to respond to available information.
• Maximize Flexibility: This objective maximizes the ability of the alternative to operate in uncertain operating environments, which improves the ability of these systems
to adapt to future changes. The measure for the Maximize Flexibility objective are:
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– Maximize Deployability: deployability corresponds to the ability of the surveillance or interdiction alternative to be deployed within the search area.
– Maximize Payload: the capacity of the alternative to support supplementary or
complementary constituent systems. Larger payloads offer additional capacity
for future systems or capabilities.
– Maximize Growth Potential: ability of the system to continue to support this
mission while improving relevant capabilities. Technologies near the end of
expected useful life generally will not have the growth potential that newer
technologies do.
• Minimize Cost: Minimize the costs associated with the system. Acquisition cost is
typically included in a trade study of competing alternatives. Because the systems
employed in this trade study are used for other missions (e.g. USCG search and
rescue, USN patrols), only operations costs are considered. The systems employed
for the counter-trafficking mission, whether detection or interdiction, also perform
other maritime security missions since they are part of the counter-trafficking acknolwedged SoS. Acquisition cost is not included because the constituent systems
are used for other missions (e.g. USCG search and rescue, USN patrols). The measures for this objective are:
– Minimize Reconfiguration Cost: the cost required to reconfigure the alternative
with technologies that support new, or improve existing, capabilities.
– Minimize O&M Costs: the cost to operate and maintain the system. These
figures are not widely available, and are estimated for a six month planning
horizon and 500 operating hours.
• Minimize Loss: Losses can result from crashed or abandoned craft, and provide
opportunities for sensitive technologies to fall into the wrong hands. Avoiding these
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losses, and recovering lost capabilities, are important for this SoS. The measures for
the Minimize Loss objective are:
– Maximize Control: direct control of a surveillance or interdiction asset (e.g.
piloted craft) offers more control than indirectly controlled craft (e.g. autonomous systems).
– Maximize Recoverability: the ability to recover the capability if lost. In general, smaller assets with readily available technologies are easier to replace than
custom or tailored systems.
• Minimize International Incidents: Disrupting routine traffic or violations of national
maritime or air boundaries can cause incidents which adversely impact the overall
counter-trafficking mission. The measures for this objective include:
– Maximize Positive Identification: disruptions to legitimate commercial and
recreational traffic reduce the tolerance for poorly performing counter-trafficking
alternatives.
– Maximize International Cooperation: in order to support efforts in certain areas within the Transit Zone, coordination and cooperation with international
partners is required.

5.2. TRADE STUDY
Authoritative data to support precise values for each of the performance attributes
of the counter-trafficking SoS are not all openly available. This research uses estimates for
certain objectives and measures, and are noted in the detailed description of the objectives
and measures above.
Ground truth for the mix of smuggling vessels used by DTOs are also not openly
available. The initial meta-architecture analysis uses the mix of smuggling vessels from
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2004 in Table 2.2. In 2004, 43% of seized smuggling vessels were fishing boats and 57%
were go-fast boats. This is important since the counter-trafficking SoS detection and interdiction capabilities depend on the types of smuggling vessels used by DTOs.
5.2.1. Value Functions. The purpose of creating value functions is to transform
measure space to value space, where stakeholder value becomes the decision criteria against
which alternatives are assessed. Each system objective must have a corresonding value
function in order to be used in this analysis. The value functions developed in this research
are approximations since stakeholders were not involved in this research.
Surveillance alternatives satisfy the surveillance capability for the counter-trafficking
SoS. The value functions for surveillance constituent system alternatives are shown in Figure A.1. These functions use linear or sigmoid functions to transform the rating for each
measure to stakeholder value. All value function ranges are [0,1]. Operating costs are
estimated for the purposes of this analysis. The measure ratings for each surveillance alternative is provided in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Measure ratings for surveillance alternatives in initial environment.
Measures
C-27J
HC-130J
P-3 MQ-9 Scaneagle RQ-4
Range (nm)
2675
5000 2380
675
809 12300
Endurance (hours)
12
14
16
24
24
34
Availability (percent)
33
25
15
20
95
65
Deployability (index)
3
3
2
4
10
6
Payload (index)
8
8
9
4
1
3
Growth Potential (in4
4
3
6
6
5
dex)
Reconfiguration Cost
7
8
7
8
6
4
(index)
O&M Cost (FY14 10,000
12,000 8,000 4,500
1,000 3,500
$/hr)
Control (index)
10
10
10
4
5
4
Recoverability (index)
3
2
3
5
9
6
Identification
(per(See Table A.1)
cent)
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Interdiction alternatives satisfy the interdiction capability for the counter-trafficking
SoS. The interdiction alternative value functions are shown in Figure A.2. These functions
use linear or sigmoid functions to transform the rating for each measure to stakeholder
value. All value function ranges are [0,1].
The set of alternatives and corresponding rating for each measure is included in
Table 5.2. The interdiction system alternative performance differs between the types of
smuggling vessels. The interdiction capability, bi j , is a relative score of the ability of the
interdiction system i to interdicte smuggling vessel type j. For all combined smuggling
vessels in the environment,
ci = Â p j bi j

(5.1)

i, j

where p j is the fraction of total trafficking events using smuggling vessel type j, ci j
is the capability of the initial environment, and c0i j is the capability in the new environment.
The Interdiction Parameters calculations table is presented in Appendix A.
5.2.2. Calculating the Alternative Value. Trade studies map performance ratings
from measure space to value space by accounting for the degree of importance that the
measure has on the overall system and the swing, or range of value, across the available
alternatives. The alt-swing IPython Notebook was developed and used to perform the
computations for this trade study. Appendix B describes the alt-swing IPython Notebook
and provides the Python code.
The value of alternative i for measure j is evaluated based on the value functions
described in Section 5.2.1,

vi j = f j (mi j )

(5.2)

where f j is the value function for measure j and mi j is the score of alternative i for measure
j.
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Table 5.2. Measure ratings for interdiction alternatives in the initial environment.
Measures
Availability (percent)
Track Speed (knots)
Range (nm)
Interdiction Capability
(percent)
Deployability (index)
Growth Potential (index)
Reconfiguration Cost
(index)
O&M Cost (FY14 $/hr
Control (index)
Recoverability (index)
Positive Identification
(percent)

MH-60T
50
170
300

MH-65D
SH-60
50
30
160
146
150
450
(See Table A.3)

LRI-II OTH-IV RB-S
75
80
85
38
40
45
225
200
175

2
4

4
5

2
3

6
6

7
5

8
6

9

8

9

5

4

3

3000
9
2
95

2000
9
3
95

2500
9
1
92

1200
10
7
90

1200
10
8
88

1000
10
9
85

Measure swings are calculated as the range in value from the available alternatives.
The minimum and maximum values are determined by the available alternatives in this
trade study. The swing for each measure, s j , is defined as:

s j = max(vi j )
i

min(vi j )
i

(5.3)

This trade study uses an additive value model to determine the total alternative
value. This model uses both the swing weight (b ) and importance weight (a), such that
a + b = 1, in calculating the total alternative value. Figure 5.3 provides scatterplots for the
surveillance and interdiction importance and swings. The unnormalized weight for each
measure is calculated as

w0j = ao j + b s j

(5.4)
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(a) Surveillance measures.

(b) Interdiction measures.

Figure 5.3. Performance measure importance vs. swing for the initial environment.

where o j is the measure importance. These weights are then normalized for the final measure weight, w j , where

wj =

w0j
Â j w0j

.

(5.5)

Then, the total stakeholder value for alternative xi is

V (xi ) =

n

Â w j vi j .

(5.6)

j=1

The resulting values for each alternative provide a quantitative comparison among
the alternatives considered.
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Figure 5.4. Surveillance alternatives consequences scorecard (initial environment). The
consequences scorecard, or heatmap, depicts the value score for each alternative against
each measure. For surveillance systems, the RQ-4 tends to outperform other alternatives in
most measures. All systems tend to perform well for the Maximize Positive Identification
and Maximize Sweep Width measures.

5.2.3. Results Comparison. The RQ-4 dominates surveillance alternatives in all
measures except search effort and payload. The C-27J is dominated by most alternatives
except for sweep width. For the interdiction alternatives, the MH-60T Jayhawk outperforms the other assets, but the set of alternatives tend to perform well in general. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 provide heatmaps of each alternative’s score against each measure. This
display allows straightforward comparisons between performance measures and across al-
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Figure 5.5. Interdiction alternatives consequences scorecard (initial environment). All of
the interdiction systems tend to provide about the same value. The contribution for each
alternative differs, and the LRI-II tends to perform the best among the set of alternatives.
Most of the alternatives perform very well for control and positive identification. The
alternatives vary the greatest in range, recoverability and track speed.

ternatives. Table 5.3 summarizes the resulting stakeholder value for each surveillance and
interdiction alternative.
Multiple alternatives can participate as constituent systems within the countertrafficking SoS. The resulting values indicate how beneficial each alternative is in terms
of stakeholder value. Those constituents with higher stakeholder value can be targeted for
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Table 5.3. Surveillance and Interdiction alternative values. The results of the trade study
provide a value for each surveillance (left) and interdiction (right) alternative in the initial
environment.
Surveillance Alternative
C-27J
HC-130J
MQ-9
P-3
RQ-4
Scaneagle

Value
27.2
31.1
32.2
32.5
51.6
43.0

Interdiction Alternative
LRI-II
MH-60T
MH-65D
OTH-IV
RB-S
SH-60

Value
82.7
59.9
63.9
81.7
78.5
61.2

more frequent or regular use within the SoS, subject to availability constraints for other
missions.

5.3. SOS EVALUATION IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT
The initial SoS architecture may be used for a period of time. After DTOs understand the capabilities available to the counter-trafficking SoS, they develop new forms of
smuggling vessels to mitigate performance advantages of the counter-trafficking SoS. The
emergence of submersible vessels affects the detection and interdiction performance of the
counter-trafficking SoS. SoS stakeholders need to know how the SoS is affected in order
to make acquisition decisions for new systems or to engage stakeholders that have needed
capabilities that exist for other missions. Understanding how the SoS is affected allows
the right set of capabilities to be targeted for development or inclusion in the SoS. This
behavior exemplifies the idea of coevolution between the SoS and the environment.
5.3.1. Changes in the Operating Environment. Because information on the smuggling vessel mix used by DTOs is not openly available, the mix of DTO smuggling vessels
from 2009 in Table 2.2 is used to demonstrate the change in the operating environment. In
2009, 12% of smuggling vessels were fishing boats, 44% were go-fast boats and 44% were
submersibles, an increase from 0% in 2004. For this analysis, submersibles are evenly
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split between semi-submersibles and fully-submersibles. Each type of smuggling vessel
has different ratings for the counter-trafficking detection and interdiction capabilities.
Evaluating SoS performance in terms of stakeholder value enables the comparison
of the new environment with the existing counter-trafficking SoS meta-architecture. Other
considerations such as anticipated time for the DTO to overcome an alternative’s detection
or interdiction capability can also influence the alternative performance. In essence the
coevolutionary behavior exhibited by these dueling architectures allows one architecture to
hold an operational advantage for a limited amount of time.
Understanding how coevolution affects the SoS is important in order to identify
candidate solutions or improvements that address the changes in the environment. By
evaluating the performance changes of each objective and measure within the objectives
hierarchy allows the key capabilities impacted by environmental changes. In this case, the
environmental changes consists of new DTO vessels that are challenging to detect and interdict. Identifying key capabilities that improve the SoS performance focuses the solution
space on those capabilities that directly improve SoS performance.
5.3.2. Impact on SoS Value. The DTO smuggling vessel change reflects a change
in the trafficking meta-architecture. This essentially changes the environment that the
counter-trafficking system is operating in. Figure 5.6 illustrates the change in constituent
system values after the smuggling vessel changes described above. The smuggling vessel
change decreased the stakeholder value of both the surveillance and interdiction alternatives. Only the Maximize Interdiction objective was influenced by the change to the DTO
architecture change.
A comparison of the subset of objectives that were affected by this evolution in
smuggling vessels is depicted in Figure 5.7. Almost all measures are affected for surveillance systems, and the interdiction capability of all interdiction alternatives was reduced.
Since the impact is on specific objectives (Detection and Limit Impacts for surveillance craft, and Interdiction for interdiction systems), comparing the initial SoS with the
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SoS performance in the new environment for only those objectives affected allows decision makers to target new alternatives to increase the SoS performance and value delivery
to SoS stakeholders.

5.4. COEVOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVE GENERATION
Section 5.3.2 demonstrated that the use of submersible vessels by DTOs significantly reduces the stakeholder value delivered by the existing counter-trafficking SoS.
These smuggling vessels allow DTOs to evade current detection capabilities and avoid
interdiction. Further, these vessels can stay submerged for over a week, requiring that
counter-trafficking assets maintain contact, through electronic or other means, throughout

Surveillance Alternative Values
in Different Environments
RQ−4

Interdiction Alternative Values
in Different Environments

56.1

Scaneagle

42.8

MQ−9

31.7

HC−130J
P−3

28.8
26.9

C−27J

24.1

82.7
81.7

RB−S

78.5

71.5
70.2
70.1
33.4
27.8

17.4
14.7
13.4
13.3
2004

LRI−II
OTH−IV

2009

(a) Surveillance alternatives.

RQ−4
Scaneagle

MH−65D

63.9

SH−60
MH−60T

61.2
59.9

MQ−9
P−3
HC−130J
C−27J
2004

LRI−II
OTH−IV
RB−S

56.4

MH−65D

53.8
52.0

MH−60T
SH−60

2009

(b) Interdiction alternatives.

Figure 5.6. Alternative values before and after smuggling vessel evolution. The slopegraphs show the steep changes in surveillance (a.) and interdiction (b.) alternative values
as a result of the different DTO smuggling environments from 2004 and 2009. In this
instance, most alternatives retain their relative position with respect to the overall set of
alternatives, with the exception of the SH-60 and the HC-130J.
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(a) Initial surveillance alternatives scorecard for
detection and impacted objectives.

(b) New surveillance alternatives scorecard for detection and impacted objectives.

(c) Initial interdiction alternative interdiction and
impacted objectives.

(d) New interdiction alternatives value for interdiction and impacted objectives.

Figure 5.7. Impact of smuggling vessel evolution on surveillance and interdiction constituents. The evolution of smuggling vessels results in degraded performance for all
surveillance and interdiction constituent system alternatives for the counter-trafficking SoS.
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this time. Maintaining contact requires the counter-trafficking system to use limited resources on a single effort for extended periods of time, reducing the availability of these
systems for other missions. The reduced performance of the counter-trafficking SoS forces
stakeholders to seek new capabilities in order to improve SoS performance in this new
environment.
5.4.1. New SoS Capabilities. Section 5.2.3 showed the impact of the evolutionary behavior on the part of the DTOs by implementing new smuggling vessels. This
change primarily impacted the Maximize Detection and Maximize Interdiction objectives.
Other changes to the environment, such as new technologies that disrupt the control of
autonomous aircraft, or new policies that change the operations and maintenance costs of
SoS alternatives, would impact other SoS objectives. New alternatives should be developed
that focus on the adversely impacted objectives. Creating a new SoS meta-architecture that
increases SoS performance and stakeholder value requires that new alternatives focus on
Maximizing Detection and Maximizing Interdiction in the new environment.
By design, submersibles have a low detection profile for surface and air sensors.
By traveling underwater, these vessels evade radar and EO/IR sensors. However, they
have unique sonar signatures. This requires the ability to detect the vessels while moving
underwater, and coordinate with interdiction assets to seize the vessel. Current approaches
by DTOs require that submersibles surface for a period of time in order to offload the illicit
cargo for final transportation to land, where the drugs are distributed. Current interdiction
alternatives are able to seize the submersible while it is surfaced. In addition, submersibles
have limited operating ranges and cannot stay submerged indefinitely. Surfacing provides
an opportunity to interdict the submersible, but requires that interdiction assets be aware of
the location of the submersible when it does so.
Existing systems that are not part of the initial SoS meta-architecture could support
improved submersible detection. These systems are currently used for other purposes. The
USN has a submarine fleet that is used for defense missions. Submarines are capable of
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tracking targets underwater for extended periods of time. Submarines have unique capabilities and mission sets, but are cost-prohibitive to use for the counter-trafficking mission.
The USN also uses sonobuoys for detecting underwater threats. Bailey [79] describes a
buoy developed specifically for the counter-trafficking system. This buoy is designed to
detect go-fast boats and operates at depths of 50-600 feet with a 6–12 month operational
life. This buoy uses satellite communications links to report detection events within a 5 nm
radius, but is not designed to track the target. With additional development, this type of
sonobuoy may be designed to detect submersibles using either active or passive sonar and
provide target tracks for a detected vessel.
Another alternative is the use of autonomous systems. Autonomous system use for
land, sea and air missions is growing rapidly. Although these technologies are in the early
stages of development, many are being matured to meet operational requirements and environmental challenges. Such systems could improve SoS performance for the counter-drug
mission. Unmanned underwater vessels (UUVs) operate submerged and can be operate
autonomously or semi-autonomously. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has developed an UUV that is intended for use in port security operations [80]. This small vessel
navigates autonomously to maritime targets, attaches to the target’s hull, and uses an ultrasound sensor to scan the target’s hull to detect hollow compartments storing contraband.
While currently in development and prototype testing stages, a similar type of UUV with
improved range and navigation could be used in the counter-trafficking mission. Zorn
[55] also identifies a cutter-based UUV for use in maritime security and maritime domain
awareness missions. These vessels have a range of around 80 nm, and could be delivered
by cutter or interdiction assets. In the future, these types of vessels may be delivered by
other systems such as surveillance aircraft. The UUVs described by Hardesty and Zorn are
considered for the future notional counter-trafficking architecture.
5.4.2. Future SoS Alternatives. The following scenarios are considered for evolving the SoS meta-architecture. These scenarios, as a response to DTO adaptations in smug-
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gling vessels, completes the coevolution example between the counter-trafficking SoS and
the environment. This notional future concept is a multi-stage delivery, tracking and interdiction concept using UAVs, sonobuoys and UUVs in the counter-trafficking SoS metaarchitecture.
• Cutter-based UUV Future Alternative: The first stage delivery system (e.g. NSC)
carries a secondary stage delivery system (e.g. UAV) and the UUV autonomous system (e.g. an enhanced version of the one developed by MIT). Upon a target detection
by an array of deployed sonobuoys, the secondary stage delivery system (e.g. MH65D) navigates to the proximal detection location, and deploys the UUV. The UUV
navigates to the target using on-board navigation systems and communications with
the sonobuoy array. The UUV attaches to the target vessel once it is intercepted. The
target is scanned to classify the vessel as threat or benign, and results are communicated to the C2 system. If the target is classified as a threat, the UUV tracks the
target, and reports the target state while maintaining contact with the target. When
the target surfaces, interdiction assets are coordinated to interdict the DTO vessel
once it is no longer submerged. This notional operational concept omits the need for
high-value counter-trafficking assets to maintain single-target detection and tracking
for extended periods of time, and supports coordination of interdiction assets so that
they are available at the right time and right place.
• UAV-based UUV Future Alternative: In this concept, a UAV, equipped with the same
UUV detector, performs multiple missions simultaneously. The primary mission,
ISR, is conducted as a surveillance platform. The secondary mission is to serve as
the first stage delivery vehicle of the UUV. Suppose, as before, that a sonobuoy array
target detection occurs. In this concept, the UAV navigates to within close proximity
to the detection, and delivers the UUV to that location. The advantage in this concept
is that the UAV can navigate to very close proximity to the target location, whereas in
the first concept, delivery is limited to the range of the MH-60T. Once submerged, the
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UUV navigates to the location of the target, which reduces the required range of the
UUV (assuming it attaches to the target and uses the target propulsion for maneuvre).
The rest of the scenario is as above, where communication to the counter-trafficking
C2 system is maintained, and interdiction assets are coordinated once the target is
no longer submerged. This concept is depicted graphically in Figure 5.8. Figure 5.9
depicts the OV-1 of this SoS meta-architecture alternative.
5.4.3. Assessing New SoS Meta-Architectures. The new SoS meta-architectures
share interdependencies between constituent systems. In the new environment, interdiction
assets rely on the detection and tracking of submersibles in order to function. Without
interdiction systems capable of interdicting submersibles, the UUV has no significant role.
Agent based modeling allows these interdependencies to be modeled and the SoS to be
simulated in various environments. Chapter 6 describes the agent based model used for
this analysis.

a)

b)

c)

Figure 5.8. Future SoS meta-architecture evolution concept. An example operation with
a new SoS architecture: a) Sonobuoys are deployed to detect, track and monitor DTO
submersible movements. These systems communicate detection events and target tracks
to the ISR system. b) Upon target detection and identification, an unmanned underwater
vessel (UUV) is deployed in the vicinity of the target by a UAV. The UUV navigates to
target using target tracks and an on-board tracking system. c) The UUV attaches to the
target’s hull, communicating location and target state to the ISR system. The target’s track
is monitored and interdiction assets are deployed when the submsersible surfaces.
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Figure 5.9. OV-1 for a future UAV-based UUV meta-architecture alternative. This alternative uses new technologies to address degraded SoS performance resulting from the
new environment. Existing surveillance and interdiction alternatives are modified to enable communications and payload delivery (UUV) against new smuggling vessels (submersibles).
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6. AGENT BASED MODEL FOR THE SOS META-ARCHITECTURE

Agent based modeling allows the exploration of sytem behavior by defining how
agents interact with other agents and the environment. The ABM paradigm aids SoS metaarchitecture performance assessment, particularly when system interactions are known
generally, strict formulations describing system dynamics are unavailable, and individual behavior of constituent systems affects SoS performance as a whole. The countertrafficking SoS can be modeled using ABM by describing agent rules and behaviors and
assessing performance by varying the types of constituent systems that participate in the
SoS.

6.1. STUDY QUESTIONS
The counter-trafficking SoS meta-architectures described in Chapter 5 are evaluated
using ABM. Agents represent constituent systems, smuggling vessel targets and commercial vessels (benign traffic). Each agent has properties and rules that govern its behavior.
ABM enables exploration of candidate SoS meta-architectures by varying the types of
constituent systems operating in different environments. Environments are constructed by
varying the frequency of DTO smuggling vessel use and amount of commercial boat traffic. Meta-architecture performance is based on the percent of each smuggling vessel type
detected, the percent of each type interdicted, the percent of trafficked drugs interdicted,
and the operating cost of the meta-architecture. The goal of this simulation is to provide
insight into the SoS meta-architectures that perform best in varied operating environments.
The agent based model for this research was built using AnyLogic 7.2 Educational
Version software. The agents, properties and behavior rules are described in Section 6.2.
Figure 6.1 provides an animation snapshot of agent interactions during simulation runtime.
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Figure 6.1. Agent based model runtime animation. Each agent in the ABM is identified,
along with a few corresponding attributes, such as interdictor range and surveillance lateral
range.

6.2. AGENTS, PROPERTIES AND BEHAVIOR RULES
The following sections describe the agent properties and statecharts for the ABM.
Some agents are subclassed to define other agents, such as smuggling vessels that extend
the Boats agent and helicopters that extend the Interdictor agent. Agent subclasses inherit
the properties, states and behavior logic of the parent agent, but are assigned properties
specific to the agent type that are assigned when the agent is created at runtime.
In this model, simple rules govern agent behavior. The logic for each agent is controlled by statecharts. Figure 6.2 depicts the statecharts for each of the primary agents in
the ABM. Commercial and smuggling vessels are randomly assigned a starting location
along a boundary. Each vessel chooses a random waypoint that is closer to the final destination at the opposite boundary. Each successive move is in the general direction of the
vessel’s final destination.
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Surveillance aircraft are assigned a random starting location opposite the start of
vessels. These agents fly a random search path across the simulation space. Waypoints are
uniformly distributed across the simulation environment. If a smuggling vessel is within
radar range, a detection occurs based on the lateral range curve. Upon detection, the craft
flies to the target and maintains target visibility for a specified period of time. If a Maritime
Platform vessel with an interdiction asset are available, an interdiction occurs, else the
target is released. The simulation environment consists of a 1,000 nm x 1,000 nm boundary
and runs for a continuous 4,000 hour simulated time period (approximately six months).
6.2.1. Maritime Platform Agent. The Platform agent models systems that can
deliver interdictors and small surveillance systems. These include the National Security
Cutter operated by the USCG, and the Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate operated by the
USN. The Maritime Platform agent properties are described in Table 6.1. Figure 6.2a
presents the Maritime Platform statechart, and agent behavior rules are described in Algorithm 1.

Table 6.1. Maritime platform agent properties.
Name
cruiseSpeed
maxSpeed
range
endurance

Description
agent speed during normal operation
agent speed when reacting to an event
distance the agent can travel
time the agent is able to be continuously deployed
lateralRange
radar detection range
qtyInterdictors array of the number of interdiction agents the
platform can carry
qtySurveillors array of the number of surveillance craft the
agent can carry
location
current location of agent
nextWaypoint the waypoint the agent transits to unless reacting to an event

Units
knots
knots
nm
hours
nm
count
count
lat/lon
lat/lon
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(a) The Platform statechart defines the conditional
logic controlling agent states.

(c) The Interdictor agent
statechart defines the conditional logic controlling
Interdictor and subclassed
agent states.

(b) The Surveillance statechart defines the conditional logic controlling Surveillance and subclassed agent states.

(d) The Boat statechart defines the conditional
logic controlling Boat and subclassed smuggling
vessel agent states.

Figure 6.2. Agent statecharts for the agent based model. Logic within each state controls
agent behavior. The SoS tends to rely on the Maritime Platform agent to resolve detection
and interdiction requests.

6.2.2. Surveillance Agent. The Surveillance agent models both manned and unmanned aerial surveillance systems. The Surveillance agent properties are described in
Table 6.2. Figure 6.2b presents the Surveillance agent statechart, and agent logic is described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 1 Platform agent behavior.
initalize agent and set properties
goto surveilling
while Surveilling do
navigate to random waypoint
search for targets
if ( target within range ) then
goto Tracking
end if
if ( receive interdiction request ) then
goto EvaluateInterdiction
end if
if ( reached endurance ) then
return to port; goto initialize
end if
end while
while Tracking do
if ( interdiction asset available before timeout ) then
launch available interdictor agent
goto Interdict
else release target; goto Surveilling
end if
end while
while EvaluateInterdiction do
if ( interdiction asset available and within range ) then
goto Interdict
else goto Surveilling
end if
end while
while Interdict do
navigate to target
if ( recovered interdiction asset ) then
goto Surveilling
end if
end while

6.2.3. Interdictor Agent. The Interdictor agent represents interdiction systems
that seize smuggling vessels. Interdictors include helicopters and interceptor boats. These
are implemented as a subclass of the Interdictor agent. The Interdictor agent properties
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Table 6.2. Surveillance agent properties.
Name
cruiseSpeed
maxSpeed
range
endurance

Description
Units
agent speed during normal operation
knots
agent speed when reacting to an event
knots
distance the agent can travel
nm
time the agent is able to be continuously de- hours
ployed
lateralRange
detection range of radar sensors
nm
payload
carrying capacity for surveillance agents
index
path
sequence of waypoints the agent navigates
lat/lon array
currentLocation current location of agent
lat/lon
nextWaypoint
the waypoint the agent transits to unless re- lat/lon
acting to an event

described in Table 6.3 are derived from Table 4.5. Figure 6.2c presents the Interdictor
statechart and agent behavior is described in Algorithm 3.
6.2.4. Boat Agent. Boat agents represent commercial boats (benign targets), and
smuggling boats. Each smuggling vessel type is a subclass of the Boat agent. This allows
properties specific to fishing boats, go-fast boats and submersibles to be assigned at agent
creation. Differences between these vessels, including speed, radar visibility and sonar
visibility, affect Surveillance and Interdiction agent performance. Smuggling vessel properties are based on Table 4.2. Smuggler agent properties for the ABM are described in
Table 6.4. Figure 6.2d presents the Boat agent statechart, and agent behavior is described
in Algorithm 4. Boats move randomly in the same general lateral direction across the simulation environment and, unless interdicted, exit the simulation upon arrival to the final
waypoint.
6.2.5. UUV Agent. The UUV agent models unmanned underwater vessels that are
delivered by Mfaritime Platforms or Surveillance systems and detect and track submersible
vessels. Once attached to the submersible, the UUV relays location information to the
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Algorithm 2 Surveillance agent behavior.
initalize agent and set properties
goto Surveilling
while Surveilling do
navigate to random waypoint
search for targets
if ( target detected ) then
goto Tracking
end if
if ( reached endurance ) then
return to port; goto initialize
end if
end while
while Tracking do
follow target
if ( target resolved and interdiction asset available before timeout ) then
request Interdictor from Platform agent
goto Interdict
else release target; goto Surveilling
end if
end while
while Interdict do
follow target
if ( Interdictor agent releases Surveillance agent ) then
goto Surveilling
end if
end while

Maritime Platoform which launches the interdiction asset. The UUV agent has simple
properties of speed and range. The agent behavior rules are described in Algorithm 5.
6.2.6. Sonobuoy Agent. The Sonobuoy agent models sonobuoys that detect submersibles and go-fast boats. Upon detection, the sonobuoy reports the target location to
a Surveillance or Maritime Platform agent, depending on the architecture being modeled.
The UUV agent has a single property of sonarRange which models the radius and the
M-beta lateral range curve for the buoy. Sonobuoys are randomly deployed at stationary
locations between 200–300 nm from the edge of simulation area nearest boat arrival lo-
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Table 6.3. Interdictor agent properties.
Name
cruiseSpeed
maxSpeed
range
endurance

Description
agent speed during normal operation
agent speed when reacting to an event
distance the agent can travel
time the agent is able to be continuously deployed
lateralRange
detection range of radar sensors
availability
percent of time the asset is available to perform the interdiction mission
seizeRange
range that a target agent must be within to be
interdicted
isSeizable
binary array of smuggler agents ability to be
seized by the agent
payload
carrying capacity for sensor agents
currentLocation current location of agent
targetLocation
location of the target agent (smuggler)

Units
knots
knots
nm
hours
nm
percent
nm
array
index
lat/lon
lat/lon

cations (x) and uniformly across the width of the simulation area (y). The agent behavior
rules are described in Algorithm 6.
6.2.7. Main Agent. The Main agent is an artifact of the AnyLogic modeling environment. This agent defines simulation level properties, including the parameters varied
across simulation trials, output files for simulation results, and the ABM presentation layer.
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Algorithm 3 Interdictor agent behavior.
initalize agent and set properties
goto Surveilling
while Surveilling do
navigate to random waypoint
search for targets
if ( target detected ) then
goto Tracking
end if
if ( reached endurance ) then
return to port; goto initialize
end if
end while
while Tracking do
follow target
if ( target resolved and interdiction asset available before timeout ) then
request Interdictor from Platform agent
goto Interdict
else release target; goto Surveilling
end if
end while
while Interdict do
follow target
if (Interdictor agent releases Surveillance agent ) then
goto Surveilling
end if
end while
Algorithm 4 Boat agent behavior.
initalize agent and set properties
goto Moving
while Moving do
navigate to random waypoint
if ( interdicted by interdiction agent ) then
goto Interdicted
end if
if ( reached final waypoint ) then
goto Exited
end if
end while
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Table 6.4. Boat agent properties.
Name
cruiseSpeed
maxSpeed
capacity
detectability

Description
agent speed during normal operation
agent speed when reacting to an event
carrying capacity for illicit drugs
ability of the agent to be detected; this value
is p(d) for the M-Beta detection model
type
type of smuggling vessel: fishing vessel, go-fast boat, semisubersible, or fullysubmersible
path
sequence of waypoints the agent navigates
currentLocation the current location of the agent
targetLocation
the target location of the agent
startingLocation initial location of the agent
nextWaypoint
the waypoint the agent transits to unless reacting to an event
arrivalRate
rate that the agent enters the simulation

Algorithm 5 UUV agent behavior.
initalize agent and set properties
goto Moving
while Moving do
navigate to target
if ( reached target ) then
stay with target
message Maritime Platform of current location
end if
if (target interdicted) then
goto Exited
end if
end while
Algorithm 6 Sonobuoy agent behavior.
initalize agent and set properties
goto Surveilling
while Surveilling do
if ( target detected ) then
report location to nearest agent with UUV capability
end if
end while

Units
knots
knots
index
percent
index
lat/lon array
lat/lon
lat/lon
lat/lon
lat/lon
qty/hour
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7. RESULTS

Chapter 5 demonstrated the impact of coevolution on the counter-trafficking constituent systems and described new systems to address the impacts of smuggling vessel
use. Chapter 6 described the agent based model developed to assess multiple SoS metaarchitectures using these new systems. The results of the agent based model allow exploration of these meta-architectures and their performance characteristics in different operating environments.

7.1. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
Table 7.1 describes the factors and levels of the simulation experiment for the
counter-trafficking system. The performance characteristics used for this study include
operating cost, percent of trafficking vessels detected, and percent of trafficking vessels
interdicted. Each experiment sets the factors at a defined level and uses these parameters
for the model settings. The performance characteristics are outputs from these settings.
The environment is represented by other variables outside of the control of the
counter-trafficking SoS. For the simulation study, these variables are the percent of smuggling traffick of each vessel type: fishing vessels, go-fast boats, and submersibles.

Table 7.1. Agent based model parameter settings. The experiment parameter settings define the architecture simulated in each trial.
Variable
Number of Platforms
Number of Sonobuoys
Number of Surveillance Systems
UUV Range
Interdictor Range

Minimum Maximum Step Size
1
2
1
0
150
30
0
3
1
50
100
25
150
300
75
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7.2. EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
Exploratory data analysis allows the behavior of the model to be better understood.
Insights drawn from this analysis lead to decisions about how the model can be improved,
new studies to undertake, and support decisions that affect overall SoS performance.
Cost affects most decisions, and operating cost is a driving component of total cost.
Understanding the performance of the SoS based on different architectures is important.
Figure 7.1 displays drug seizure performance versus operating cost for each of the simulated architectures. These architectures represent the cutter-based UUV concept from
Chapter 5. Points are colored based on the fraction of smuggling vessel traffic that is conducted by submersibles. Submersibles have a strong influence on the overall performance
of the SoS, where other smuggling vessels allow the SoS a greater ability to seize illicit
cargo.
Another performance measure for the SoS is the percent of smuggling vessels interdicted. Figure 7.2a indicates that the number of surveillance craft (NumUAVs) and percent
of smugglers using go-fast boats (PctGF) do not signifantly influence this performance
measure. However, interdictor range tends to become more important as the percent of
go-fast boats increases, and SoS architectures with larger range interdictors (helicopters)
tend to outperform those with shorter range craft (such as interdictor boats).
The range of UUVs is another architecture characteristic simulated in the agent
based model. These ranges are a result of uncertainty in the future operating capability
of UUVs. Figure 7.2b shows the influence that this characteristic has on the overall drug
seizure performance of the SoS. The frequency of DTO submersible use corresponds to
different environments. UUV range becomes marginally more important as the frequency
of submersible use grows. However, this property is far exceeded by submersible use, as
seen in the negative trend across facets.
The agent based model simulated 3,888 different meta-architecture - environment
scenarios. These architectures are composed by differing the numbers and features of con-
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stituent systems that comprise the SoS. The star plot, or kiviat chart, helps visualize the
differences among these architectures. Figure 7.3 depicts a random sample of these architectures, ordered by increasing operating cost. Each star represents architecture features
of number of maritime platforms, number of surveillance craft, and number of sonobuoys.
Performance measures of percent of smugglers interdicted, percent of drugs seized and
SoS operating cost over the six-month simulated time period are also included. In general,
SoS meta-architectures with a greater number of constituent systems tend to perform well.
However, some architectures outperform their more costly alternatives in terms of percent
of smugglers and percent of drugs interdicted. These insights help support decision makers
when considering trades among alternative SoS architectures.

Drug Seizure Performance vs Operating Cost

Fraction Smuggled Drugs Seized

1.00

0.75
Fraction Submersible
Vessels
0.05
0.15
0.25

0.50

0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.25

0.00
10000

20000

Total Operating Cost ($k)

Figure 7.1. Seizure performance versus operating cost. LOESS curves have been fitted for
different environments, defined by the fraction of smuggling vessels that are submersibles.
Increased use of DTO submersibles significantly reduce SoS performance.
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(a) Interdiction performance versus operating cost. Each facet corresponds to the number
of surveillance craft (columns) and percent of DTO vessels that are go-fast boats (rows).
As expected, additional surveillance assets increase to the SoS operating cost, but architectures with fewer surveillance craft have similar overall DTO smuggler interdiction
performance.
Percent of Drugs Seized by UUV Range
and Submersible Frequency
0.05

0.15

0.25

●

0.8
0.6
0.4

●

Percent of Drugs Seized

0.2
0.0

●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●

0.35

0.45

0.55

0.65

●

●

0.45

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0

●
●
●

0.8
0.6
0.4
●

0.2
0.0
50

75

100

50

75

100

UUV Range (nm)

(b) Seizure performance versus UUV range. Different environments are represented by submersible frequency. UUV range becomes marginally more important
as the volume of submersibles grows. This effect is dwarfed by the trend in reduced
drug seizure performance from increased volumes of submersible vessels.

Figure 7.2. Meta-architecture performance results.
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Figure 7.3. SoS meta-architectures and performance. A random subset of modeled
SoS meta-architectures, ordered by increasing cost. These plots depict the number of
sonobuoys, surveillance craft, and maritime platforms along the three upper-right axes. The
other three (lower-left) axes depict meta-architecture performance in operating cost, percent of drugs seized, and percent of smuggling vessels interdicted. The meta-architecture
encoding is included below each plot. Some meta-architectures with fewer platforms and
surveillance craft still perform well. In general, increased drug seizure and vessel interdiction performance comes at increased operating cost.
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7.3. REGRESSION METHOD
The challenge of understanding simulated SoS meta-architecture performance becomes a mulivariate nonlinear regression problem. Support vector machines and random
forests are two methods that support multivariate nonlinear regression problems. Random
forests are used for this problem because they have recently demonstrated considerable
robustness in a range of classification and regression problems. These models use many
subsets of the data to construct decision models, and then averages these models together to
improve the overall estimate. Figure 7.4 depicts the error rate as a function of the number
of trees in the random forest.
As demonstrated in Section 7.2, the volume of submersible vessels has a large
influence on SoS performance. Table 7.2 displays the relative importance of each independent variable for the cutter-based UUV concept. The response variable for the random forest is percent of smuggling vessels seized. Surveillor quantity and maritime platform quantity tend to not impact the overall performance, suggesting that the number of
sonobuoys and interdictor range are more important considerations when developing the
counter-trafficking SoS architecture. DTO smuggling vessel use also strongly influences
the SoS performance.
Table 7.2. Random forest variable importance.
Variable
Importance
Percent Submersible
0.0354
Percent Go-fast Boats
0.0046
Sonobuoy Quantity
0.0247
Interdictor Range
0.0014
UUV Range
0.0012
Surveillor Quantity
-0.0001
Platform Quantity
-0.0003
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Figure 7.4. Random forest error rate by number of trees. The error rate is associated with
the forecast percent of smuggling vessels seized, the response variable modeled in this
random forest.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

8.1. CONCLUSION
Modern systems continue to grow in complexity. Engineered systems-of-systems
pose challenges for traditional systems engineering approaches due to complex stakeholder
environments, asynchronous development of constituent systems, and changing operating
environments. Many modern systems-of-systems must adapt to changes in the operating
environment in order to maintain or improve performance. Mutual adaptation between
the system and the environment lead to coevolution as both seek performance advantages.
This behavior compounds the complexity of engineered systems-of-systems and further
challenges traditional systems engineering approaches.
This work demonstrated an approach to assess a coevolutionary system-of-systems.
A trade study of SoS constituent systems demonstrated the impact of an adaptive environment on stakeholder value. New SoS architecture concepts were created to address capability gaps and reduced stakeholder value. These concepts were explored in detail using
agent based modeling, and the results demonstrated the usefulness of these architectures
in the new environment. The results of this modeling demonstrated the substantial impact
that the environment can have on SoS performance, regardless of SoS meta-architecture,
if required capabilities are unavailable. The results also demonstrated that some metaarchitectures with a smaller number of constituent systems had similar seizure and interdiction performance but reduced operating costs.

8.2. FUTURE WORK
Future work is needed to improve the analysis of coevolutionary systems. Opportunities to improve this type of analysis include modeling coevolution, extensions to
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traditional trade studies, improvements to the agent based model, and expanding the SoS
analysis to include additional constituent systems or stakeholders.
8.2.1. Improved Modeling of SoS Coevolution. Accurate value models (or cost
functions) of the environment or competing system could support improved system design.
The value model provides a way to estimate likely adaptations in the environment or by the
competing system. These changes can be modeled to understand the impacts on system
performance. The result is testable architecture performance prior to development, and
targeting the right set of system attributes for candidate architecture selection in this future
environment.
For example, in the counter-trafficking SoS, the future implications of deploying
increasing number of UAVs, UUVs or sonobuoys is unknown. However, DTOs have previously demonstrated adaptative behaviors through avoiding interdiction using faster boats
and avoiding detection using submersible vessels. A successful change in the countertrafficking architecture is likely to intiate future changes by DTOs. However, the specific
changes they are likely to make are unknown at present. These changes could include new
travel modes (UAVs), changes to smuggling routes, or including offensive measures to defeat unmanned counter-trafficking systems (such as detecting and destroying sonobuoys).
The availability of technologies to support these adaptions is an important consideration
for future adaptations.
This work likely requires abstract models to explore the complex intra-relationships
between constituent systems, and inter-relationships between the SoS and the environment.
Kauffman’s NKCS model is one such model that requires the system to be encoded as a
chromosome or bit string [40, 81]. The work done by Dagli et al. [82] and Giammarco [83]
provide ways to encode such systems. Work by Ilachinski on complex systems, focused
on defense applications, could also be used to explore emergent behavior between the SoS
and the environment [84].
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8.2.2. Modifications to Traditional Trade Studies. The approach demonstrated
in this research considers a single objectives hierarchy for the SoS. Acknolwledged SoS
consist of many differeent stakeholders and constituent systems necessary for other, unrelated missions. Constituent system stakeholders likely have objectives and values beyond those of an individual SoS. Additional work is needed to incorporate a hierarchy of
stakeholder objectives or value functions. Doing so allows SoS objectives and constituent
system stakeholder objectives to be considered in the SoS analysis. This disaggregatoin of
value functions would help identify constitient systems most adept to participating in the
SoS. Such a method could also expose gaps in needed capabilities.
8.2.3. Agent Based Modeling. The agent based model developed in this research
is an abstraction of the SoS. Several assumptions could be relaxed to provide a more accurate SoS representation. Future work could include additional performance measures,
availability of constituent system to support the counter-trafficking mission, and additional
environmental variables that influence detection probability and interdiction capability.
Operational considerations, such as traditional search patterns including parallel sweep or
inward spriral patterns, could also be included. These search pattersn yield better detection
performance for stationary targets than random searches.
Additional work is needed to validate and verify the agent based model. Operators
and subject matter experts inform the logic behind the model and constituent system performance attributes to support validation. Empirical drug seizure data with greater fidelity
than the UNODC data could be used to support model verification.
8.2.4. SoS Assessment. The counter-trafficking SoS includes other capabilities
not studied in this work. This includes law enforcement efforts to curb cultivation and share
information to increase smuggling interdiction. Inclusion of these other aspects of the SoS
in the analysis allows other alternatives to be explored and prioritized. The role of information sharing, and network centric concepts of information reach, timeliness and quality
are important consideration for coordination interdiction efforts. For example, modeling
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law enforcement resources could affect the volume and specificity of information available
to the counter-trafficking SoS. Future models could include these aspects of the SoS to
understand the affects of information sharing.
Finally, the results of the agent based model provide a mapping between input (SoS
architecture and behavior rules) and output (performance measures). For complex systems,
these relationships are likely nonlinear. Statistical methods such as multivariate nonlinear
regression provide a way to construct a meta-model. Such methods define the mapping
between dependent and independent variables. A meta-model provides a way to assess
new architectures not explicity simulated. These models support decision making for the
SoS architecture.

APPENDIX A

TRADE STUDY DETAILS
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The surveillance and interdiction capability tables are included below. These capabilities are influenced by the types of smuggling vessels in the environment.
INITIAL AND ADAPTED ENVIRONMENT CAPABILITIES
The surveillance and interdiction capabilities differ across smuggling vessel types.
Since the type and frequency of smuggling vessels changes between the initial and adapted
environments, the SoS performance is impacted.
Surveillance capability depends on the alternative sweep width W and search effort
Z. This analysis uses the “cookie-cutter”, or M-beta, detector model. For alternative i and
smuggling vessel j, sweep width is

Wi j = pi j Ri

(A.1)

where Ri is the lateral range and pi j is the detection probability. Search effort is

Zi j = Wi j Li

(A.2)

where Li is the range of alternative i. Coverage is

Ci j = Zi j /A

(A.3)

where A is the search area being covered; A = 1, 000 for this analysis. To account for search performance against multiple types of smuggling vessels, the sweep width,
search effort and coverage are estimated using the fraction of each type of smuggling vessel
l j:
Wi⇤ = Â l jWi j
j

(A.4)
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Zi⇤ = Â l j Zi j

(A.5)

Ci⇤ = Â l jCi j

(A.6)

j

j

The interdiction capability differs between the types of smuggling vessels. The
interdiction capability, bi j , is a relative score of the ability of the interdiction system i to
interdicte smuggling vessel type j. For all combined smuggling vessels in the environment,
ci = Â p j bi j

(A.7)

i, j

where p j is the fraction of total trafficking events using smuggling vessel type j.
For the trade study, ci j is the capability of the initial environment, and c0i j is the capability
in the new environment.

Table A.1. Search parameters for the initial environment.

Cruise Speed, est. (knots)
Range (nm)
Endurance (hours)
Detection Range (km)
Lateral Range (nm)
P(d) - Fishing Boat
Sweep Width - Fishing Boat
Search Rate - Fishing Boat
Search Effort - Fishing Boat
Coverage - Fishing Boat
Positiive ID - Fishing Boat
P(d) - Go-fast Boat
Sweep Width - Go-fast Boat
Search Rate - Go-fast Boat
Search Effort - Go-fast Boat
Coverage - Go-fast Boat
Positive ID - Go-fast Boat
Fishing Boat Fraction
Go-fast Boat Fraction
W*
R*
Z*
C*
Positive Identification*

C-27J HC-130J P-3 Orion MQ-9 Scaneagle
RQ-4
220
374
328
80
55
130
2675
5000
2380
675
809
12300
12
14
16
24
24
34
200
200
200
200
150
200
108
108
108
108
81
108
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
97
97
97
97
73
97
21382
36350
31879
7775
4009
12635
259989
485961
231317 65605
58971 1195464
260
486
231
66
59
1195
0.70
0.90
0.70
0.85
0.95
0.95
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.90
97
97
97
97
73
97
21382
36350
31879
7775
4009
12635
259989
485961
231317 65605
58971 1195464
260
486
231
66
59
1195
0.80
0.80
0.90
0.99
0.99
0.95
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57
97.19
97.19
97.19 97.19
72.89
97.19
21382
36349
31879
7775
4009
12634
259989
485961
231317 65604
58971 1195464
259
485
231
65
58
1195
0.76
0.84
0.81
0.93
0.97
0.95
106

Table A.2. Search parameters for the adapted environment. The new capability uses the same search parameters for fishing boats and
go-fast boats from the initial environment (Table B. 1).
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C-27J HC-130J P-3 Orion MQ-9 Scaneagle
RQ-4
Cruise Speed, est. (knots)
220
374
328
80
55
130
Range (nm)
2675
5000
2380
675
809 12300
Endurance (hours)
12
14
16
24
24
34
Detection Range (km)
200
200
200
200
150
200
Lateral Range (nm)
108
108
108
108
81
108
P(d) LPV - Semi-submersible
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
Sweep Width - Semi-submersible
22
22
22
22
16
22
Search Rate - Semi-submersible
4752
8078
7084
1728
891
2808
Search Effort - Semi-submersible
57775
107991
51404 14579
13105 265659
Coverage - Semi-submersible
58
108
51
15
13
266
Positive ID - Semi-submersible
0.15
0.05
0.00
0.40
0.40
0.30
P(d) - Fully-submersible
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Sweep Width - Fully-submersible
0
0
0
0
0
0
Search Rate - Fully-submersible
0
0
0
0
0
0
Search Effort - Fully-submersible
0
0
0
0
0
0
Coverage - Fully-submersible
0
0
0
0
0
0
Positive ID - Fully-submersible
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fishing Boat Fraction
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
Go-fast Boat Fraction
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
Semi-submersible Fraction
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
Fully-submersible Fraction
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
W*
55
55
55
55
41
55
R*
12164
20679
18136
4423
2281
7188
Z*
147905
276458
131594 37322
33548 680086
C*
147.9
276.5
131.6
37.3
33.5
680.1
Positive Identification*
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.59
0.60
0.56

Table A.3. The set of interdiction capability parameters for the initial and adapted environments.

Fishing Boat Interdiction Capability
Go-fast Boat Interdiction Capability
Fishing Boat Fraction
Go-fast Boat Fraction
Interdiction Capability — Initial Environment (ci j )
Fishing Boat Interdiction Capability
Go-fast Boat Interdiction Capability
Semi-submersible Interdiction Capability
Fully-submersible Interdiction Capability
Fishing Boat Fraction
Go-fast Boat Fraction
Semi-submersible Fraction
Fully-submersible Fraction
Interdiction Capability — Adapted Environment (c0i j )

MH-60T MH-65D SH-60 LRI-II OTH-IV RB-S
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.9
0.8
0.99
0.99
0.4
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43 0.43
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.57 0.57
0.99
0.99
0.65
0.82
0.73 0.63
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.9
0.8
0.99
0.99
0.4
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.15
0.4
0.2
0.1
0
0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12 0.12
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22 0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.22 0.22
0.6028
0.5808 0.3118 0.4868
0.392 0.318
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VALUE FUNCTIONS
The value functions for the trade study use linear and sigmoid functions to translate
measure space to stakeholder value space. The value functions for the surveillance and
interdiction measures are included in Figures A.1 and A.2, respectively. Table A.4 and
A.5 provide some parameters for these value functions. The full parameter set for these
functions is provided in Section B.2.

Figure A.1. Surveillance alternative value functions. The trend of each function corresponds to a minimization (decreasing) or maximization (increasing) objective.
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Figure A.2. Interdiction alternative value functions. The trend of each function corresponds
to a minimization (decreasing) or maximization (increasing) objective.

Table A.4. Objectives for surveillance alternatives.
Objective
Detection
Detection
Detection
Detection
Detection
Detection
Flexibility
Flexibility
Flexibility
Cost
Cost
Limit Losses
Limit Losses
Limit Impacts

Measure
Importance Minimum Maximum
Maximize Range
55
500
15000
Maximize Endurance
90
10
36
Maximize Sweep Width
85
25
125
Maximize Coverage
95
0
2000
Maximize Search Effort
80
30000
1200000
Maximize Availability
50
25
100
Maximize Deployability
75
0
10
Maximize Payload
60
0
10
Maximize Growth Potential
50
0
10
Minimize Reconfiguration Cost
35
0
10
Minimize O&M Cost
65
0
15000
Maximize Control
15
0
10
Maximize Recoverability
30
0
10
Maximize Positive Identification
55
50
100

Ideal
15000
36
125
2000
1200000
100
10
10
10
0
0
10
10
100

Units
nm
hours
nm
unitless
sq. nm
percent
index
index
index
index
USD/hour
index
index
percent
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Table A.5. Objectives for interdiction alternatives.
Objective
Interdiction
Interdiction
Interdiction
Interdiction
Situational Awareness
Situational Awareness
Flexibility
Flexibility
Flexibility
Cost
Cost
Cost
Limit Losses
Limit Losses
Limit Impacts

Measure
Importance Minimum Maximum Ideal Units
Maximize Speed
75
50
200 200 knots
Maximize Range
80
100
500 500 nm
Maximize Interdiction Capability
85
1
10
10 index
Maximize Availability
60
25
100 100 percent
Maximize Information Sharing
55
1
10
10 index
Maximize Coordination
80
1
10
10 index
Maximize Deployability
75
1
10
10 index
Maximize Payload
45
1
10
10 index
Maximize Upgradability
65
1
10
10 index
Minimize Acquisition Cost
20
100
1200 100 $K
Minimize Reconfiguration Cost
40
3
150
3 $K
Minimize O&M Cost
35
2.5
15
2.5 $K
Maximize Control
50
1
10
10 index
Maximize Recoverability
45
1
10
10 index
Maximize Positive Identification
90
50
100 100 percent
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RESULTS
The overall results of the trade study are presented in Section 5.2.3. The contribution of each alternative against each measure, in terms of stakeholder value, are useful to
compare the relative performance across alternatives for each measure. Alternative values
for each performance measure are normalized for the parallel coordinates plot in Figure
A.3. These results are for the SoS architecture in the initial (non-submersible) environment.
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(a) Surveillance alternatives

(b) Interdiction alternatives

Figure A.3. Parallel coordinates plots for surveillance and interdiction alternative values
for each performance measure. Measure values are normalized to show comparisons by
value contribution of each alternative. Performance values for each measure are normalized
independently.

APPENDIX B

PYTHON IMPLEMENTATION
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The alt-swing software tool was developed as part of this research. The code is
provided in Appendix B. The goal of this tool is to enable more rapid trade space exploration when performing a trade study of a set of alternatives. The software is developed
as an IPython Notebook, and is made available on GitHub as open source software under
the MIT license. The tool generates an HTML report based on user input from text and
CSV files to generate a formatted HTML report. An example HTML report is included in
Section B.4.
DESCRIPTION
The following code, developed as part of this research, is an implementation of
the Systems Engineering tradeoff study framework [23, 25]. The code is made available
at https://github.com/gm4/alt-swing. A User Guide is available at http://gm4.github.io/altswing/.
The alt-swing Python code has the following requirements:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Python 2.7
IPython notebook
scipy (0.15.1)
numpy
pandas (0.16.1)
matplotlib
seaborn (0.5.1)
markdown
jinja2

PYTHON CODE

# coding: utf-8
# # Alternative Analysis Using the Swing Weight Matrix
# An IPython Notebook implementation of the Systems Engineering trade study method
# described at http://sebokwiki.org/wiki/Decision_Management.
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# get_ipython().magic(u’matplotlib inline’)
from __future__ import division
import numpy as np
import scipy as sp
from scipy.special import expit
import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns
sns.set(style = ’whitegrid’) # plot aesthetics
import markdown
from jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader
# -------# distribution short names
sigString = ’sigmoid’
linString = ’linear’
powString = ’power’
triString = ’triangular’
# Value function range [0, vfRange]
vfRange = 100.0
# Weights for Importance and Swing for Swing Weight calculation
impWt = 0.65
swWt = 1.0 - impWt
# For large figures with subplots
numPlotCols = 3 # number of columns
# HTML output
htmlReport = True
# #### Define the Allowable Value Functions
# the linear, or scaled, function
def scale(x, xMin, xMax):
""" Returns x between [0.0, 1.0] from original domain of [xMin, xMax]. """
return (x - xMin) / (xMax - xMin)
# the triangular function
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def triangular(x, l, c, r):
""" Returns the [0,100] scaled triangular value function evaluated
at x for (l)eft, (c)enter, (r)ight triangular parameters."""
return vfRange * max(min(((x - l)/(c - l)), ((r - x)/(r - c))), 0.0)
# the bell function
def bell(x, a, b, c):
""" Returns the [0,100] scaled generalized bell curve
evaluated at x for (c)enter and shape parameters a and b."""
return vfRange * 1.0 / (1.0 + pow(np.abs((x - c)/a), (2.0*b)))
# the sigmoid function
def sigmoid(x, a, c):
"""Returns the [0,100] scaled sigmoid function evaluated
at x for (a)lpha and (c)enter."""
return vfRange * (1.0 / (1.0 + np.exp(-1.0 * a * (x - c))))
# -------# ## Read Input Files
# ### Objectives and Measures
# Read directly into a ‘pandas‘ DataFrame
# Define the set of value function families to use:
# Family

|

Value Function Form

# ------- | ------------------------------------------# Linear

|

$$ f(x) = mx + b $$

# Power

|

$$ f(x) = mx^a $$

# Sigmoid |

$$ f(x) = \frac{a}{b + e^{-ax/2}} $$

objDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/surveillance-objectives.csv’,
index_col = [’Objective’, ’Measure’])
# objDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/surveillance-objectives-subset.csv’,
index_col = [’Objective’, ’Measure’])
# objDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/interdiction-objectives.csv’,
index_col = [’Objective’, ’Measure’])
# objDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/interdiction-objectives-subset.csv’,
index_col = [’Objective’, ’Measure’])
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# objDF

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

# #### Build the Value Functions for Each Objective and Measure
# This section creates plots of the value functions defined for each measure.
# The result
# is a series of figure with subplots of each value function.
# ---------# **Note:** *If you defined additional value functions above,
# you will need to add these to
# the below loop to make sure they are evaluated.*
# --------tmpDF = pd.DataFrame(columns=[’Measure’, ’Score’, ’Value’])
# Get the number of unique Measures to plot
numPlotRows = int(round(
np.ceil(len(objDF.index.levels[1].unique()) / numPlotCols), 0))
fig, axs = plt.subplots(numPlotRows, numPlotCols, figsize = (13, 15))
# Loop through the subplots and objDF indices
for ax, idx in zip(axs.flat, objDF.index):
vals = objDF.loc[idx] # get the dataframe columns for this index
axMin = float(vals.Minimum)
axMax = float(vals.Maximum)
domain = np.linspace(axMin, axMax)
# Build the corresponding value function
if vals.Family == ’sigmoid’:
valFunc = [sigmoid(i, float(vals.Param1), vals.Param2) for i in domain]
if float(vals.Slope) == -1.0:
valFunc[:] = [vfRange - i for i in valFunc]
elif vals.Family == ’linear’:
valFunc = [vfRange * scale(i, axMin, axMax) for i in domain]
if float(vals.Slope) == -1.0:
valFunc[:] = [vfRange - i for i in valFunc]
elif vals.Family == ’power’:
valFunc = [vfRange * np.power(scale(i, axMin, axMax),
vals.Param1) for i in domain]
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if float(vals.Slope) == -1.0:
valFunc[:] = [max(valFunc) - i for i in valFunc]
elif vals.Family == ’triangular’:
valFunc = [triangular(i, axMin, vals.Param1, axMax) for i in domain]
if float(vals.Slope) == -1.0:
valFunc[:] = [max(valFunc) - i for i in valFunc]
else:
valsFunc = [0]*len(domain)
print ’This value function family is not yet implemented.’
tmpDF.Measure = str(idx[1]) # Assign the Measure
tmpDF.Score = domain
tmpDF.Value = valFunc
plotTitle = str(idx[1])
tmpDF.plot(ax=ax, x = ’Score’, y = ’Value’, title = plotTitle, legend = False)
plt.subplots_adjust(hspace = 0.7)
for ax in axs.flat[axs.size - 1:len(objDF.index) - 1:-1]:
ax.set_visible(False)
plt.suptitle(’Value Functions’, fontsize = 16)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/value-functions.png’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/value-functions.pdf’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.show()
# ### Alternatives
# Read directly into a ‘pandas‘ DataFrame
altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/surveillance-alternatives-0.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/surveillance-alternatives-1.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/surveillance-alternatives-0-subset.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/surveillance-alternatives-1-subset.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/interdiction-alternatives-0.csv’,
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index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/interdiction-alternatives-1.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/interdiction-alternatives-0-subset.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
# altDF = pd.read_csv(’./input/interdiction-alternatives-1-subset.csv’,
index_col=[’Objective’, ’Measure’, ’Alternative’])
altDF[’Consequence’] = np.NaN
# altDF

#

Uncomment to view inline

# -------# ## Score each Alternative against each Objective and Measure
for item, val in altDF.iterrows():
idxString = list(item) # convert this alternative’s index to a list
print ’\n\nidxString is: ’, idxString
print ’val is: \n -----\n’, val, ’\n-----’
# drop the ’Alternative’ from the index used for the objective DataFrame
objIdx = idxString[0:2]
print ’objective index is: \n’, objIdx
# get the corresponding objective for this index
obj = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1],]
print ’objDF row is: \n’, obj
score = np.NaN
funcFamily = str(obj[’Family’]) # get the corresponding value function family
# the measured value for this alternative
paramX = altDF.ix[idxString[0], idxString[1], idxString[2]][’Score’]
paramSlope = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1]][’Slope’] # the slope
paramXMin = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1]][’Minimum’] # minimum acceptable
paramXMax = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1]][’Maximum’] # maximum desirable
paramX1 = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1]][’Param1’] # 1st function parameter
paramX2 = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1]][’Param2’] # 2nd function parameter
paramX3 = objDF.ix[objIdx[0],objIdx[1]][’Param3’] # 3rd function parameter
if funcFamily == sigString:

122
print str(idxString[0:2]) + ’ is ’ + sigString
score = sigmoid(paramX, paramX1, paramX2)
if float(paramSlope) == -1.0:
score = vfRange - score
elif funcFamily == linString:
print str(idxString[0:2]) + ’ is ’ + linString
score = vfRange * scale(paramX, paramXMin, paramXMax)
if float(paramSlope) == -1.0:
score = vfRange - score
elif funcFamily == powString:
print str(idxString[0:2]) + ’ is ’ + powString
score = np.power(scale(paramX, paramXMin, paramXMax), paramX1)
if float(paramSlope) == -1.0:
score = vfRange - score
elif funcFamily == triString:
print str(idxString[0:2]) + ’ is ’ + triString
score = triangular(paramX, paramXMin, paramX1, paramXMax)
if float(paramSlope) == -1.0:
score = vfRange - score
else:
print ’The "’,funcFamily, ’" value function family is not yet implemented.’
if score > 100.0:
score = 100.0
elif score < 0.0:
score = 0.0
print ’Value against this measure is ’, score
altDF.loc[(idxString[0], idxString[1], idxString[2]),’Consequence’] = np.round(
float(score), 3)
print altDF[’Score’].dropna(’index’)

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

# ----------# ## Calculate the Swing Weight for each Objective and Measure
objDF.loc[:,’Swing’] = np.NaN
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for idx, val in objDF.iterrows():
try:
objMin = min(altDF.loc[(idx[0], idx[1]),’Consequence’])
objMax = max(altDF.loc[(idx[0], idx[1]),’Consequence’])
except:
print "\nNo Score found for ", idx
objMin = np.NaN
objMax = np.NaN

swing = objMax - objMin
objDF.loc[(idx[0], idx[1]),’Swing’] = swing
print idx, ’ min: ’, objMin, ’

max: ’, objMax, ’

swing: ’, swing

objResults = objDF.copy()
objResults.reset_index(inplace=True)
print objResults
sns.lmplot(x="Swing", y="Importance", data=objResults, fit_reg=False,
hue = "Measure", aspect=1.3, scatter_kws={"s": 100},
palette=sns.color_palette("Paired", n_colors=16, desat=.5))
plt.xlim(-0.1,101)
plt.ylim(-0.1,101)
plt.title("Measure Swing vs. Importance")
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/swing-importance.png’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/swing-importance.pdf’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
# ### Calculate the Unnormalized Weight
objDF.loc[:,’Weight’] = impWt * objDF.Importance + swWt * objDF.Swing
# ### Calculate the Normalized Weight
objDF.loc[:,’NormdWt’] = objDF.loc[:,’Weight’] / objDF.loc[:,’Weight’].sum()
# objDF

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

# ------------# ## Evaluating the Alternative’s Value
# ### Calculate Total Value for Each Alternative
# $$
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# V(x) = \sum_{i = 1}^{n}w_{i} v_{i}(x_{i})
# $$
# where $V(x)$ is the total value, $i$ is the index of the objective/measure,
# $w_i$
# is the normalized weight for objective/measure $i$, $x_i$ is the
# alternative’s score
# for objective measure $i$, and $v_i(x_i)$ is the corresponding value of $x_i$.
for idx, vals in altDF.iterrows():
altDF.loc[:,’WtdConsequence’] =
objDF.loc[(idx[0],idx[1]),’NormdWt’] * altDF.Consequence
# altDF

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

print(altDF[’WtdConsequence’].dropna(’index’))
# -----------# ## Visualizing Output
# #### Heatmap (Consequences Scorecard)
# Display the relative performance of each Alternative against each Measure.
heatDF = altDF.drop([’Score’, ’Units’, ’WtdConsequence’], axis = 1)
heatDF.reset_index(inplace=True)
summaryDF = altDF.drop([’Score’, ’Consequence’], axis=1).groupby(
level = ’Alternative’).agg(sum)
summaryDF.columns = [’Value’]
# summaryDF

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

tmpDF = altDF.drop([’Units’, ’Consequence’], axis = 1)
# tmpDF

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

for idx, cols in tmpDF.iterrows():
val = summaryDF.loc[(idx[2]), ’Value’]
tmpDF.loc[idx,’Value’] = val
heat_rect = heatDF.pivot(’Alternative’, ’Measure’, ’Consequence’)
# heat_rect.dropna("columns")

# Uncomment to view the DataFrame inline

print(heat_rect)
sns.heatmap(np.round(heat_rect.dropna(’columns’), 0),
annot=True, fmt=’g’, cbar=False)
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plt.title("Heatmap of Alternative Measure Values")
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/value-scorecard.png’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/value-scorecard.pdf’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
# #### Trellis Plot of Alternative Value vs Measure Score
# Allows a quick comparison of the total value and original score of
# Alternatives against all Measures.
summaryDF.reset_index(inplace=True)
sns.barplot(’Alternative’, ’Value’, data=summaryDF, palette=’muted’)
plt.ylabel("Value")
plt.ylim(0,60)
plt.title(’Total Alternative Value’)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/value-barplot.png’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/value-barplot.pdf’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
print(summaryDF)
tmpDF.reset_index(inplace=True)
grid = sns.FacetGrid(tmpDF, col="Measure", hue="Alternative", col_wrap=3, size=4,
legend_out = True, sharex=False, sharey=True)
grid.map(plt.plot, "Score", "Value", marker="o", ms=14, alpha=0.6)
grid.fig.tight_layout(w_pad=1)
sns.set_context("paper", font_scale=1.6)
grid.add_legend()
grid.savefig(’./html_report/images/measure-trellis.png’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
grid.savefig(’./html_report/images/measure-trellis.pdf’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
# Format the DataFrame to produce the parallel coordinates plot.
fooDF = heat_rect.copy()
# normalize the measure values for the parallel coordinates plot
for col in fooDF.columns:
fooDF[col] = (
fooDF[col] - np.min(fooDF[col])) / (np.max(fooDF[col]
) - np.min(fooDF[col]))
print(fooDF)
# reset the index, but keep ’Alternative’ as a column
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fooDF = fooDF.reset_index(level=0,drop = False)
fooDF.index.name = None
plt.figure(figsize = (15,6))
pd.tools.plotting.parallel_coordinates(fooDF, ’Alternative’, colormap = ’Set2’)
plt.xticks(rotation=60)
plt.ylabel("Normalized Performance")
plt.title(’Alternative Performance vs Measure’)
plt.legend(loc=’center left’, bbox_to_anchor=(1, 0.5))
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/parallel-coordinates.png’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
plt.savefig(’./html_report/images/parallel-coordinates.pdf’, bbox_inches=’tight’)
# ----------------# ## The creation of the HTML Report is availabe from the online version.
#

It requires additional input files that the user can modify to tailor the

#

report.

# -----------

INPUT DATA
The input data can be generated in spreadsheet software. However, the Python code
requires this data in comma separated values (CSV) files.
1. Surveillance Alternatives. The initial set of surveillance alternatives include
the following data stored as a comma separated values (CSV) file.
2. Interdiction Alternatives. The following objectives and measures correspond
to the interdiction capability of the counter trafficking SoS:
Objective,Measure,Importance,Minimum,Maximum,Ideal,Units,Family,Slope,Param1,Param2,Param3
Interdiction,Maximize Speed,75,50,200,200,knots,linear,1,1,,
Interdiction,Maximize Range,80,100,500,500,nm,sigmoid,1,0.04,300,
Interdiction,Maximize Interdiction Capability,85,10,100,10,percent,sigmoid,1,0.1,55,
Interdiction,Maximize Availability,60,25,100,100,percent,sigmoid,1,0.25,67.5,
Situational Awareness,Maximize Information Sharing,55,1,10,10,index,linear,1,,,
Situational Awareness,Maximize Coordination,80,1,10,10,index,linear,1,,,
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Flexibility,Maximize Deployability,75,1,10,10,index,linear,1,,,
Flexibility,Maximize Payload,45,1,10,10,index,sigmoid,1,1.15,6,
Flexibility,Maximize Upgradability,65,1,10,10,index,linear,1,,,
Cost,Minimize Acquisition Cost,20,100,1200,100,$K,sigmoid,-1,0.01,550,
Cost,Minimize Reconfiguration Cost,40,3,150,3,$K,linear,-1,,,
Cost,Minimize O&M Cost,35,2.5,15,2.5,$K,sigmoid,-1,0.3,9,
Cost,Minimize Retirement Cost,25,5,120,5,$K,linear,-1,,,
Limit Losses,Maximize Control,50,1,10,10,index,sigmoid,1,1.3,5,
Limit Losses,Maximize Recoverability,45,1,10,10,index,sigmoid,1,1,5,
Limit Impacts,Maximize Positive Identification,90,50,100,100,percent,sigmoid,1,0.3,75,

The following input corresponds to the initial interdiction alternatives
Alternative,Objective,Measure,Score,Units
MH-60T Jayhawk,Interdiction,Maximize Speed,170,knots
MH-60T Jayhawk,Interdiction,Maximize Range,300,nm
MH-60T Jayhawk,Interdiction,Maximize Interdiction Capability,7,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Interdiction,Maximize Availability,70,percent
MH-60T Jayhawk,Situational Awareness,Maximize Information Sharing,6,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Situational Awareness,Maximize Coordination,6,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Flexibility,Maximize Deployability,1,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Flexibility,Maximize Payload,7,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Flexibility,Maximize Upgradability,7,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Cost,Minimize Acquisition Cost,,$K
MH-60T Jayhawk,Cost,Minimize Reconfiguration Cost,,$K
MH-60T Jayhawk,Cost,Minimize O&M Cost,,$K
MH-60T Jayhawk,Cost,Minimize Retirement Cost,,$K
MH-60T Jayhawk,Limit Losses,Maximize Control,9,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Limit Losses,Maximize Recoverability,5,index
MH-60T Jayhawk,Limit Impacts,Maximize Positive Identification,80,percent
MH-65D Dolphin,Interdiction,Maximize Speed,160,knots
MH-65D Dolphin,Interdiction,Maximize Range,150,nm
MH-65D Dolphin,Interdiction,Maximize Interdiction Capability,7,index
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MH-65D Dolphin,Interdiction,Maximize Availability,90,percent
MH-65D Dolphin,Situational Awareness,Maximize Information Sharing,6,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Situational Awareness,Maximize Coordination,6,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Flexibility,Maximize Deployability,6,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Flexibility,Maximize Payload,5,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Flexibility,Maximize Upgradability,5,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Cost,Minimize Acquisition Cost,,$K
MH-65D Dolphin,Cost,Minimize Reconfiguration Cost,,$K
MH-65D Dolphin,Cost,Minimize O&M Cost,,$K
MH-65D Dolphin,Cost,Minimize Retirement Cost,,$K
MH-65D Dolphin,Limit Losses,Maximize Control,9,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Limit Losses,Maximize Recoverability,5,index
MH-65D Dolphin,Limit Impacts,Maximize Positive Identification,60,percent
LRI-II,Interdiction,Maximize Speed,38,knots
LRI-II,Interdiction,Maximize Range,225,nm
LRI-II,Interdiction,Maximize Interdiction Capability,3,index
LRI-II,Interdiction,Maximize Availability,95,percent
LRI-II,Situational Awareness,Maximize Information Sharing,4,index
LRI-II,Situational Awareness,Maximize Coordination,4,index
LRI-II,Flexibility,Maximize Deployability,10,index
LRI-II,Flexibility,Maximize Payload,3,index
LRI-II,Flexibility,Maximize Upgradability,6,index
LRI-II,Cost,Minimize Acquisition Cost,,$K
LRI-II,Cost,Minimize Reconfiguration Cost,,$K
LRI-II,Cost,Minimize O&M Cost,,$K
LRI-II,Cost,Minimize Retirement Cost,,$K
LRI-II,Limit Losses,Maximize Control,9,index
LRI-II,Limit Losses,Maximize Recoverability,8,index
LRI-II,Limit Impacts,Maximize Positive Identification,99,percent
OTH-IV,Interdiction,Maximize Speed,40,knots
OTH-IV,Interdiction,Maximize Range,200,nm
OTH-IV,Interdiction,Maximize Interdiction Capability,3,index
OTH-IV,Interdiction,Maximize Availability,95,percent
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OTH-IV,Situational Awareness,Maximize Information Sharing,4,index
OTH-IV,Situational Awareness,Maximize Coordination,4,index
OTH-IV,Flexibility,Maximize Deployability,10,index
OTH-IV,Flexibility,Maximize Payload,5,index
OTH-IV,Flexibility,Maximize Upgradability,7,index
OTH-IV,Cost,Minimize Acquisition Cost,,$K
OTH-IV,Cost,Minimize Reconfiguration Cost,,$K
OTH-IV,Cost,Minimize O&M Cost,,$K
OTH-IV,Cost,Minimize Retirement Cost,,$K
OTH-IV,Limit Losses,Maximize Control,9,index
OTH-IV,Limit Losses,Maximize Recoverability,8,index
OTH-IV,Limit Impacts,Maximize Positive Identification,99,percent
RB-S,Interdiction,Maximize Speed,45,knots
RB-S,Interdiction,Maximize Range,175,nm
RB-S,Interdiction,Maximize Interdiction Capability,4,index
RB-S,Interdiction,Maximize Availability,95,percent
RB-S,Situational Awareness,Maximize Information Sharing,4,index
RB-S,Situational Awareness,Maximize Coordination,4,index
RB-S,Flexibility,Maximize Deployability,10,index
RB-S,Flexibility,Maximize Payload,4,index
RB-S,Flexibility,Maximize Upgradability,6,index
RB-S,Cost,Minimize Acquisition Cost,,$K
RB-S,Cost,Minimize Reconfiguration Cost,,$K
RB-S,Cost,Minimize O&M Cost,,$K
RB-S,Cost,Minimize Retirement Cost,,$K
RB-S,Limit Losses,Maximize Control,9,index
RB-S,Limit Losses,Maximize Recoverability,8,index
RB-S,Limit Impacts,Maximize Positive Identification,99,percent
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EXAMPLE HTML OUTPUT
The below figures present the HTML output from the alt-swing code. The goal
of this tool is to enable more rapid trade space exploration when performing a trade study
for a set of alternatives. The formatted HTML report is optionally generated based on
user input from text and CSV files. Narrative descriptions under each section of the report
use markdown syntax text which should be modified by the user. The Python packages
markdown and jinja2 are used in the background to transform the text, tables and figures
into the HTML report automatically. The following figures are examples of this output.

131

Default alt-swing Report
Author Name

Introduction
This section introduces the trade study problem.

Bottom Line Results
To get straight to the point.

Value
Alternative
C-27J

24.113833

HC-130J

28.802832

MQ-9

31.720632

P-3

26.935759

RQ-4

56.085392

Scaneagle

42.754911

Objectives and Measures
This is boilerplate text to put in your HTML report. Describe the
objectives and measures that you use, why you selected them,
etc. You may want to include a subsection on stakeholders as
well.
The following table provides the Objectives and Measures used in
this analysis.

Importance
Objective

Measure

Detection

Maximize

Minimum

Maximum

Ideal

Units

Swing

NormdWt
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Range

Maximize
Endurance
Maximize Sweep
Width
Maximize
Coverage
Maximize Search
Eﬀort
Maximize
Availability
Flexibility

Maximize
Deployability
Maximize Payload
Maximize Growth
Potential

Cost

55

500

15000

15000

nm

80.172

0.069426

90

10

36

36

hours

76.923

0.092941

85

25

125

125

nm

42.356

0.076242

95

0

2000

2000

unitless

82.581

0.098631

80

30000

1200000

1200000

sq. nm

99.976

0.094647

50

25

100

100

percent

99.969

0.073429

75

0

10

10

index

94.588

0.089060

60

0

10

10

index

80.000

0.072896

50

0

10

10

index

61.186

0.058660

35

0

10

0

index

40.000

0.039984

65

0

15000

0

USD/hour

98.751

0.083573

15

0

10

10

index

72.437

0.038192

30

0

10

10

index

93.458

0.056805

55

50

100

100

percent

43.641

0.055515

Minimize
Reconfiguration
Cost
Minimize O&M
Cost

Limit

Maximize

Losses

Control
Maximize
Recoverability

Limit
Impacts

Maximize
Positive
Identification
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Nunc vel
gravida
dui, ac
aliquam
augue.
Vivamus
eu ultrices
mauris, sit
amet
dictum
diam.

Alternatives
This is boilerplate text to put in your report.
You may want to describe the alternatives that you use and any
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assumptions that you made.
Alternative A provides ...
Alternative B uses ...
These alternatives, and the corresponding scores for each
Objective and Measure are included in the table below:

Score

Objective

Detection

Flexibility

Maximize

Maximize

Maximize

Range

Endurance

nm

hours

nm

unitless

C-27J

2675

12

97

HC-130J

5000

14

97

MQ-9

675

24

P-3

2380

16

RQ-4

12300

Scaneagle

809

Measure

Units

Maximize

Maximize

Minimize

Minimize

Growth

Reconfiguration

O&M

Potential

Cost

Cost

index

index

index

USD

3

8

4

7

10000

3

8

4

8

12000

20

4

4

6

8

4500

15

2

9

3

7

8000

1195464

65

6

3

5

4

3500

58971

95

10

1

6

6

1000

Maximize

Maximize

Maximize

Availability

Deployability

Payload

sq nm

percent

index

260

259989

33

486

485961

25

97

68

65604

97

231

231317

32

97

1195

24

73

59

Sweep
Width

Maximize

Cost

Coverage

Search
Eﬀort

Alternative

Nunc vel
gravida
dui, ac
aliquam
augue.
Vivamus
eu ultrices
mauris, sit
amet
dictum
diam.
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Vivamus eu ultrices dui, ac aliquam
augue.

Built from alt-swing using Skeleton.
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